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Local Broadband Networks:
A New Regulatory Philosophy
James Walter Grudust
Over the next decade, the use offiber optics technologies willfundamentally
alter information transmission. New broadband delivery techniques will render
the current telecommunications regulatory structures obsolete. In this Article,
the author reviews the potential uses offiber optics and the economic and legal
issues that should be considered when forming a new regulatory policy. The
author proposes a new regulatory philosophy based upon competition and
separate regulation of information transmission and information services. The
current regulatory policies must be changed to promote optimal local network
construction. The author proposes a regulatory structure to encourage the
development of local broadband transmission facilities and provide a thriving
marketplace for novel information services.
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The doors of the past open to those who seek to know what has been
.. The doors of the present open to those who seek to know what man
can do-To master his fate by science, sustain his spirit by art and
guide his life by wisdom .... The doors to the future open to those
who wonder what life may become ..
John Rothwell Slater
Changing the form in which communication occurs will affect both the
quality and quantity of the information we receive and use. It will
influence what we know, what we think, and what we do, and shape the
organization, operation, and perception of our institutions as well.
2
Professor M. Ethan Katsh
Introduction
Broadband transmission technology via fiber optics will revolutionize the
scale of information transmission and the variety of information services
available to each member of our society.3 Thus, the philosophy underlying
telecommunications regulation, currently oriented to the older, more limited
technologies, must be reconsidered. A basic result of the implementation of
local broadband technology and an important aspect of the new philosophy is
that information transmission and information services must be characterized
and regulated separately. Government policy should encourage competition
among information providers and among local broadband network
developers.
1. John Rothwell Slater, private papers (available in the University of Rochester Rush Rhees rare books
library).
2. M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New Media Have a Message,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1989).
3. During the introduction of the Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization
Act of 1991 - S. 1200 Senator Conrad Bums stated:
A broadband communications infrastructure will be every American's tool of personal
emancipation, will generate a quantum increase in America - freedom of speech, freedom of choice,
freedom of ideas. This will allow Americans to recapture and expand upon the democratic tradition
and community spirit of the early years of this great Nation by freeing Americans from constraints
of space and time and will allow civic and economic participation for all members of this great
Republic.
CONG. REC. S7054-7061 (daily ed. June 5, 1991). See also, Peter Coy, How Do You Build An Information
Highway?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 16, 1991 at 108.
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The term broadband refers to the transmission of high frequency signals.
This Article assumes that fiber optic facilities will be the local broadband
transmission medium of choice.' In this Article, the term "information
transmission" refers to the process of moving information from one location
to another. The term "information services" encompasses numerous activities
that rely on information transmission, including voice, message, facsimile,
video, and data transmission and reception.
Technological development makes the deployment of fiber optics in local
telecommunications networks economically desirable.' Furthermore, evidence
indicates competitive transmission systems will develop in many localities.6
However, current regulatory policies discourage development of local broadband
networks.7 Many observers argue that government action must precede the
initial construction of local fiber networks.'
This Article examines technological innovations in the local telecommunica-
tions industry, provides an economic overview of the local advanced technology
marketplaces, reviews current regulatory structures and authority, and thereafter,
provides a new philosophical framework for local telecommunications regula-
tion that can fully exploit emerging fiber optic technology. Part I presents
technical innovations that will dramatically change local telecommunication
transmission and details six potential uses for broadband facilities. Part II
reviews the regulatory history of the local telecommunications industry and
describes the economic structure of the industry. Part III characterizes the
economics of emerging local broadband telecommunication marketplaces and
considers the impact of competitive pressure. Part IV discusses regulatory
authority in the local telecommunications industry. Part V proposes a division
4. After consideration of the relevant technical literature and current industry decisions, the author
assumes that ultimately fiber optics will be directly connected to each customer in most local networks.
.Some local broadband networks may integrate coaxial cable, from the curb to the customer premises, with
optical fiber in a transition period. However, such an implementation would significantly limit future high
capacity applications, even if the coaxial cable were used only over short distances. The integration of
coaxial cable and fiber optics should be viewed as an intermediate development that will help establish
sufficient consumer demand for a wide range of information services only available over broadband
transmission facilities. The author assumed fiber optics will be the ultimate transmission medium, even if
it is not the immediate choice in all local networks. Therefore, throughout this Article, the terms broadband,
optical fiber, and fiber optics will be used interchangeably.
5. See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
6. See Paul W. Shumate & Richard K. Snelling, Evolution of Fiber in the Residential Loop Plant, IEEE
COMM. MAG., Mar. 1991, at 68, 73.
7. "The Telecommunications Industry Association . . . has determined, through a comprehensive
assessment of all studies on the subject, that deployment of fiber to every consumer is 'stalled on the way
to the home' under current government policies." Conrad Burns, The Cable TV Problem -. A Procompetitive
Approach, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 16, 1990, at 16.
8. See Id., at 16; Hal Selander, The Economics of Fiber to the Subscriber, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 16,
1990, at 24; John R. Meyer & William B. Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition In Industries
Undergoing A Transition To Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 273
(1988); Tom Hausken & Vivian Brates, Fiber-to-the-Home: U.S. Policy Issues, IEEE TECHN. AND SOC'Y
MAG.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
of government responsibility and seven basic objectives to consider when
fostering a competitive environment for both information services and
transmission. The discussion in this Article provides the foundation for policy
and regulatory development, it does not attempt to formulate explicit regula-
tions. Part VI discusses related issues associated with initial construction of
local broadband networks in a competitive marketplace.
1. Information Transmission Technology
The unprecedented pace of technological innovation in the telecommunica-
tions industry9 necessitates a reformulation of present regulatory philosophy.
Specifically, the imminent construction of local fiber optic networks,'0 man-
dates a rapid re-examination of the philosophical assumptions underlying local
telecommunication regulation. Furthermore, any new regulatory policy must
recognize that scientific advancements will continue to alter the industry.
Gaining an understanding of optical fiber's properties and the implications of
other emerging technologies is critically important to formulating a new
regulatory philosophy. This Part provides a brief summary of information
transmission technology and describes the enormous potential benefits of local
fiber optic networks.
A. Fiber Optics' Transmission Rate Advantage
Fiber optics' tremendous transmission capacity is dramatically greater than
that of other telecommunications transmission media. The advantage of fiber
9. "The silicon revolution and software have combined to make undreamed-of things possible. The
price of silicon has improved six orders of magnitude or a factor of one million in thirty years. Nothing
before in history has ever changed that rapidly." Richard B. Robrock II, The Intelligent Network - Changing
the Face of Telecommunications, PROC. OF THE IEEE, Jan. 1991, at 7, 18. Furthermore,
[dlevelopments in the information processing industry, such as the steady acceleration of
computing speed and power, and the rapid diffusion of computers among businesses and
households, have opened economic and social vistas unimagined even twenty years ago. With
the cost of information processing power dropping by some 50 percent every year, it seems
likely that the impressive accomplishments of the past ten years merely foreshadow more
spectacular achievements in the future.
NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA SPECIAL PUB. No.
91-26, THE NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT 3 (1991). [hereinafter NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT].
10. For example, in New Jersey the two principle telephone network providers, New Jersey Bell and
United, under conservative assumptions will complete a 100% local fiber network connecting to every
customer between 2020 and 2030. However, under an aggressive deployment plan, favored by some industry
and state officials a 100% complete local fiber network connecting every customer may be in place between
2000 and 2010. An extreme scenario predicts a 100% completion between 2000 and 2006. 3 Deloitte &
Touche, New Jersey Telecommunications Infrastructure Study, §11, at 4-7. (January 1991) (on file with
the author). See also Mary Lu Camevale, Bell Atlantic's Phone Network To Carry Cable, WALL ST. J., Nov.
17, 1992, at C15. (FCC approval of agreement between Bell Atlantic and Sammons Communications would
allow construction of local fiber networks in three communities to begin in spring of 1993 and could be
completed by 1994).
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optics is so significant that no other fixed or mobile transmission facility can
substitute as an information highway.
1. Transmission Rates
Information is transmitted by being superimposed onto a carrier signal."
The quantity of information that can be transmitted on the carrier signal is
directly proportional to the frequency of the carrier signal. 2 Fiber optics uses
as its carrier signal a laser beam possessing a frequency approximately eight
to ten orders of magnitude higher than a telephone's ordinary electrical carrier
signal. 3 Thus, fiber's transmission capacity is approximately eight to ten
orders of magnitude greater than ordinary telephone wires. 4 For example, at
a data rate of 14,400 kilo-bits per second, a conventional modem transmitting
over ordinary telephone lines would take approximately 170 years to transmit
the entire set of documents in the Library of Congress. 5 However, at a rate
of 2.488 giga-bits per second, currently available over optical fiber, 6 the entire
contents of the Library of Congress would be transmitted in one day. 7 The
amount of information transmitted through an optical fiber can be increased not
only by standard techniques, 8 but also by techniques unavailable for copper
based transmission systems. 9
11. GERD KEISER, OPTICAL FIBER COMMUNICATIONS 2 (1983).
12. id.
13. Typical wire pair communication systems applications use an electrical signal operating at a
frequency between 10 hertz and 101 hertz, whereas optical fiber communication systems applications use
a laser operating at a frequency between 10" hertz and 101 hertz. Id. at 3; See also, JOHN M. SENIOR,
OPTICAL FIBER COMMUNICATIONS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 7 (1985).
14. "[Tlhe information-carrying capacity of optical fiber systems is already proving far superior to the
best copper cable systems." SENIOR, supra note 13, at 7.
15. Fourteen point four kilo-bits per second is a high grade modem, but not the fastest that can be used
over voice grade lines. Nineteen point two kilo-bits per second is the fastest modem in use over voice grade
lines. However, even higher rates are possible, but only over special private digital data lines. 3 Deloitte
& Touche, New Jersey Telecommunications Infrastructure Study, §4, at 18. (January 1991) (on file with
the author).
16. The Synchronous Optical Network Standard (SONET) operates at 2.488 giga-bits per second. Id.
§4, at 22.
17. Id. §9, at 2. Although a coaxial cable or twisted pair can transmit data rates significantly higher
than 9600 kilo-bits per second, the higher bit rates cannot be achieved over long distances without signal
regeneration. KEISER, supra note 11, at 60; SENIOR, supra note 13, at 7. Optical fiber does not have an
analogous fundamental transmission rate limitation. See David L. Waring et al., Digital Subscriber Line
Technology Facilitates a Graceful Transition from Copper to Fiber, IEEE COMM. MAG., March 1991, at
96, 100.
18. The capacity of a transmission facility can be increased by multiplexing, a process in which several
individual information signals are combined into one signal before transmitting. Some methods of
multiplexing can be used on both copper and fiber transmission systems. These techniques include time
division multiplexing and frequency division multiplexing. SENIOR, supra note 13, at 417.
19. Only optical fiber transmission can take a number of information signals, some that may already
have been multiplexed, and use different wavelength lasers to send all the signals over the same fiber at
once. This method is called wavelength division multiplexing. KEISER, supra note 11, at 220; SENIOR, supra
note 13, at 418.
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2. Fixed Transmission
Fixed transmission refers to permanent transmission facilities. Typically,
customers are connected to the nation's telecommunications infrastructure by
a pair of copper telephone wires2 °* 2' and a coaxial television cable. 22 Both
networks' fixed transmission facilities represent a substantial capital
investment 23  subject to lengthy depreciation periods,' and require
considerable annual investment2 and sizable maintenance expenditures.
26
Furthermore, both networks require customers to purchase or rent separate
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE), such as telephones and cable television
selectors or decoders.
An emerging standard, Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN),27 will
increase the information capacity of copper wires. 8 ISDN uses digital encod-
ing to transmit simultaneously numerous information signals over standard
copper wires. Thus, ISDN allows simultaneous voice and computer
communication over the same copper wires. However, fiber's basic information
20. Although large businesses may customize their transmission facilities, they primarily use copper
facilities to connect to the local network. However, the implementation of SONET networks are already
allowing limited usage of optical fiber.
21. "The local loop ...retains much the same technology as it has for 100 years-copper wire
physically connecting equipment with the central office." Paul MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Losing By
Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REQ. 225, 228 n.17 (1985)
[hereinafter Losing By Judicial Policymaking]. Telephone's market penetration is virtually universal. "In
1934, telephone service was available only in one out of every three households. By 1970, 91% of U.S.
households had service and, by 1984, about 98% of households had at least one telephone." id. at 230 n.29.
22. Cable television's coaxial cable, although not connected to as many customers as are telephone
wires, is in use in ninety percent of U.S. homes. Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's
Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 F.C.C. Rcd. 4962, 4966-67, 5039 (1990);
See also Mary Lu Carnevale, How Cable Bill Will Influence Rates, Service, WALL ST. J., September 28,
1992, at B1, BI 1.
23. The local exchange network represents a major component of the "capital investment in the public
network. It is reported, under the Federal Communications Commission['s] established Uniform System
of Accounts, [to represent more thanl 25% of the regional [telephonel companies' assets, or over $50
billion." Waring et al., supra note 17, at 96. "In the U.S., new residential construction accounts for between
1.5 million and 2 million lines annually .. " Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at 68.
24. The life-cycle of copper wire transmission facilities is generally considered to be twenty to thirty
years, but the emergence of competing technologies suggests a shorter period. Shumate & Snelling, supra
note 6, at 72.
25. The average annual investment per "telephone line connecting the subscriber's terminal equipment
to the public switched network and which has a dedicated port in the telephone exchange equipment" in
the U.S. is $217.89 in 1989 dollars. NTIA INFRASTRUCrURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 152-3. In 1989 New
Jersey Bell had capital expenditures of $131 per line, higher than some but lower than other local telephone
companies. 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, §4, at 99.
26. In the U.S. residential network "replacement accounts for about three (3) million lines annually."
Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at 68.
27. For background on the capabilities of ISDN, see a special issue of IEEE CoMm. MAG., Aug. 1992;
William W. Wu & Adam Livne, ISDN: A Snapshot, PROC. OF THE IEEE, Feb. 1991, at 103; Sushil N.
Pandhi, The Universal Data Connection, IEEE SPECrRUM, July 1987, at 31.
28. P. Douglas Lattneret al., Business and Residential Servicesfor the Evolving Subscriber Loop, IEEE
COMM. MAG., Mar. 1991, at 109, 113.
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capacity substantially surpasses copper wire ISDN29 and there are significant
costs associated with very high rate ISDN equipment.30 These costs and
limitations underscore that copper ISDN will not be a substitute for fiber optic
transmission facilities.3 However, the concept of High-bit-rate Digital
Subscriber Line (HDSL) may prove to be an important transitional
technology.32 This technology coupled with ISDN can provide some
broadband information services to customers over short copper facilities. 33 The
transition applications would benefit network developers by establishing
consumer demand for advanced information services before the full cost of
local fiber installation was incurred.
3. Mobile Transmission
Mobile communication technologies such as cellular telephone networks and
Personal Communications Networks (PCNs) 34 use carrier signals that
propagate through the atmosphere. Since the use of mobile communications is
growing at phenomenal rates,3 its impact on methods of fixed transmission
29. ISDN, over copper wires, transmits digitally at 64 kilo-bits per second, whereas optical fiber
transmits digitally at 2.488 giga-bits per second (Gbps). As a result, "[fliber systems deployed commercially
at 1.2 [Gbps] and 1.76 Gbps can carry 18,816 and 24,192 voice channels per fiber pair respectively." NTIA
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 94. See also Patrick E. White, The Role of the Broadband
Integrated Services Digital Network, IEEE COMM. MAG., Mar. 1991, at 116.
30. In order to approach the theoretical maximum capacities of copper facilities, the application requires
considerable equipment complexity. Specifically, when copper facilities are pushed to operate at very high
speeds such as 1.6 mega-bits per second, for technical reasons, the terminal equipment must operate ten
times faster than the transmission speeds. Waring et al., supra note 17, at 100.
31. The use of fiber optics is increasing because of its inherent advantages over copper wire:
Compared to copper or radio-based alternatives, fiber optic transmission systems have greater
immunity to interference, exhibit low signal loss, and carry a much greater amount of traffic
accurately at greater distances. These systems also have lower maintenance and servicing costs
than comparable terrestrial alternatives. As a result, fiber optic transmission facilities are
increasingly used in public and private networks.
NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 94.
32. "It is understood that HDSL will be a transitional technology, supporting the availability of
ubiquitous DSI service while fiber penetration accelerates." Waring et al., supra note 17, at 100.
33. See The Future for Wire Pair Transmission section in Waring et al., supra note 17, at 103.
34. PCNs are different from standard cellular telephones of the late 1980's and early 1990's. The
primary difference is the reduced signal power from PCN customer equipment. The consumer equipment
associated with PCNs will be small and light, but will require more network receivers thereby creating
smaller cells and the potential to service more customers. See Theodore S. Rappaport, The Wireless
Revolution, IEEE COMm. MAG., Nov. 1991, at 52.
35. "Over the past three years, the interest in wireless communications has been nothing less than
spectacular. Cellular radio systems around the world have been enjoying 33% to 50% growth rates.... Illn
the United States there were more than 6.3 million cellular telephone users as of September 1991. This
compares with 25,000 users in 1984, and 2.5 million U.S. users in late 1989." Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
International usage is experiencing growing use of cellular technology as well. "[Clellular telephone in
Sweden already enjoys a 6.6 percent adult market penetration, and this figure has been increasing by more
than 0.1 percent per month. Finland, Norway and France have been experiencing similar growth rates. In
Hong Kong, more than 50 percent of the adult population own or have operated cellular telephones." Id.
(footnotes omitted). See also Edmund L. Andrews, Cable TV Battling Phone Companies, N.Y. TIMES, March
29, 1992, at Al, 22.
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must be considered. 36  Some speculate that PCNs will provide one
identification number that could be used to reach a customer anywhere at any
time.37 The growing popularity of mobile systems 38 will provide sufficient
economic incentives for industry participanfs aggressively to pursue innovative
mobile services.39 The capacity of these mobile systems is similar to ordinary
fixed telephone transmissions.' Therefore, mobile systems should not be
considered competitors in the marketplace for broadband capabilities. However,
PCNs and cellular telephones do create competition for the provision of
standard voice communication. Some experts even predict that the PCNs
eventually will replace the need for a fixed transmission network that only
provides voice communication."
B. Other Advantages of Optical Fiber
Aside from optical fiber's phenomenal capacity to transmit information with
low attenuation, it offers many technical advantages over alternative transmis-
sion technologies. These technical advantages translate into easier placement,
lower maintenance costs, greater security for transmitted information, and
greater versatility.
Optical fibers are fabricated from glass or plastic and are usually the size
of a human hair.42 Even when covered with a protective coating, the fibers
are lighter and smaller than copper wires. Thus, fiber optics will reduce conduit
congestion.43 Optical fibers do not conduct electricity; therefore, the problems
of cross-talk, electrically noisy environments, and earth-facility contact are
36. Edmund L. Andrews, Phone Policy Starts to Blur, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at Al; Mary Lu
Carnevale, AT&T-McCaw Link Stuns Baby Bells, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6,1992, at BI ("AT&T's announcement
that it plans to team up with McCaw Cellular Communications Inc. and eventually may control the giant
cellular-telephone company left the Baby Bells dazed at the prospect of competing with a reconstituted Bell
System").
37. Rappaport, supra note 34, at 52.
38. "[l1t is conceivable that 50 million to 75 million subscribers could be using wireless systems for
various types of personal communications by the mid-1990s. This is corroborated by a recent Morgan
Stanley report that predicts cellular and PCN systems will achieve at least 12 percent market penetration
in many developed countries by the end of this century." Id. at 61.
39. John J. Keller, AT&T to Unveil Wireless-Data Alliances, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1992, at B5;
Anthony Ramirez, I.B.M. and 9 Cellular Powers Team Up for Data Transfers, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1992,
at DI ("Nine of the largest cellular telephone companies and I.B.M. plan to announce today that they are
developing methods to send data like facsimiles and electronic mail over the existing cellular telephone
network.... [I.B.M.] and the nine telephone carriers hope to expand the market sharply, from fewer than
100,000 customers today to more than 13 million by the year 2000.").
40. The frequency of mobile radio is somewhat higher than copper wire. KEISER, supra note 11, at
3. Innovative technology may someday utilize this excess band width; however, mobile radio's frequency
is significantly below that of laser signals. Id.
41. "At best [PCNs] will offer customers the ability to use a single wireless communications unit for
home, office or automobile, thereby obviating the need for a traditional wired phone to the home.".
Rappaport, supra note 34, at 52.
42. See KEISER, supra note 11, at 273-291.
43. SENIOR, supra note 13, at 7.
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nonexistent." Even though the fiber is made of glass or plastic, it is rugged
and flexible.45 Furthermore, fiber's useful life expectancy is 20 to 30 years'
and its maintenance costs are low.
47
Fiber also provides customers with a highly secure method of information
transmission." Proper transmission of laser signals requires physical integrity
of the fiber. Thus, the fiber does not emit a signal that can be easily moni-
tored.4 9
Any electrical signal can be converted easily into laser light. Therefore,
optical fiber is more versatile than copper because it will transmit both the
converted electrical signal and laser light. Since fiber will bring laser signals
into customer premises, in the future some CPE may directly process laser
signals, obviating the need for conversion to electrical impulses. 0 One poten-
tial disadvantage of fiber, as compared to copper facilities, is that fiber alone
cannot supply the power to operate a basic customer telephone as does copper.
However, many solutions have been proposed, among them small battery
backup units in the CPE.5'
C. Optical Fiber's Potential Uses
Duplex transmission52 over broadband fiber facilities will offer many
information services to customers who are already accustomed to audio
programming, computer communication, data links, facsimile transmission,
voice communication, television, and pay-per-view or video-on-demand
programming. In the near future, local fiber networks will also provide burglar
and fire alarm systems, utility meter reading, video telephones, and High
Definition Television (HDTV). 53 Optical fiber's vast capacity would allow
simultaneous transmission of duplicate services to each customer's premises.
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. Id. at 9. See also id. at 133-144.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Maintenance cost are lower because fiber requires fewer "intermediate repeaters or line amplifiers
to boost the transmitted signal strength. Hence with fewer repeaters, system reliability is generally enhanced
in comparison with conventional electrical conductor systems." Id. at 9. "Studies in Southern Bell reflect
at least a four-to-one advantage of fiber over copper for overall maintenance." Shumate & Snelling, supra
note 6, at 72.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Fiber can be tapped by severely bending the fiber so a little of the laser light escapes. However,
this method can be readily detected because of the loss of laser light power at the fiber's termination.
Nonetheless, security at switching cites is a problem for fiber optics.
50. Optical computing is an example of directly processed laser light. For a discussion of the potential
optical computing offers see RICHARD MILLER, OPTICAL COMPUTERS: THE NEXT FRONTIER IN COMPUTING,
VoLs. I & 1H (May 1986) (on file with the author).
51. Hausken & Brates, supra note 8, at 24.
52. Duplex transmission means that both parties using the transmission system can simultaneously
transmit and receive information. Fiber is inherently bi-directional. Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at
72. Local optical fiber systems could be configured using either one or two fibers to each customer.
53. Ted Sherman, Bell Hoping to Rewire Jersey, THE STAR-LEDGER, July 15, 1991, at I, 10.
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Therefore, fiber optics will make it possible for customers to choose
information services from a marketplace of competing providers.5
Once local broadband networks are in place, there will be great potential
for new information services.5" A fully developed infrastructure of local
broadband networks could stimulate private vendors and suppliers to pursue
research and development of new devices like optical switching systems and
optical computers. 6 With the advent of local broadband networks, new infor-
mation services will emerge to redefine the way citizens interact with each
other and receive essential services.
1. Access for the Disabled
Disabled citizens will derive substantial benefits from the new opportunities
provided by local fiber networks. 7 The information services provided by
broadband networks will enable the large population of physically disabled 58
to interact with office environments and general society in a manner now
difficult and expensive. A local fiber network will provide interactive voice,
video, facsimile, and computer communications all over one fiber connection
to the customer's premises. Some of these services are already available over
copper facilities, but since its capacity is limited, the quality of some services
are below that attainable over fiber facilities. 9 Furthermore, if operated
simultaneously, each information service might require a separate copper
transmission facility.' The single fiber link will replace multiple service
connections and help stimulate demand for new CPE and information services,
which may, in turn, drive market mechanisms to lower costs.
54. "The information infrastructure will ... resemble an old-fashioned village market. A multitude
of goods and services will be bought and sold through this new information marketplace .. " Michael L.
Dertouzos, Communications, Computers and Networks, Sci. AM., Sept. 1991, at 62, 67.
55. "Thus, today's technologies, and more advanced technologies not yet suitable for loop applications
but receiving attention worldwide.., offer a multitude of possibilities for future broadband service delivery
once fiber is in place." Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at 71-72.
56. MILLER, supra note 50.
57. "[A) 1986 survey found that two-thirds of all disabled persons between the ages of 16 and 64 were
unemployed, even though the bulk of those questioned said they wanted to work." NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 81. Furthermore, "[iln 1988, disabled men and women earned 36 percent and 38
percent less, respectively, than their non-disabled counterparts." Id. at 81 n.350.
58. "Today there are some 43 million Americans with some form of physical or mental disability."
Id. at 81. As the average age of individuals increases, this figure is expected to grow. Id. at 81 n.347.
59. Video images and slow data transmission are services affected by the limited capacity. "High-
quality, full motion digital video coupled with simultaneous voice and data services require [information
transmission] speeds greater than 1.5 mega bits per second [sicl." 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, §
4, at 6.
60. ISDN and associated standards such as DSL could provide limited multiple services over a single
copper facility.
100
Vol. 10: 89, 1993
Local Broadband Networks
2. Economic Development and Business Retention
Telecommunications is becoming an increasingly critical factor in the
competitive business environment.6 The telecommunications infrastructure
is an essential element in business decisions to locate, relocate, or remain in
a geographical area.62 In a survey of fifty-three economic development manag-
ers from across the country, the importance of high-speed fiber optic transmis-
sion capabilities for business customers was rated at 4.2 out of five, with five
representing critical importance.6 3 The advanced capabilities of local
broadband networks would benefit both local and national economies through
increased economic activity and increased tax bases. "One economist has
concluded that 'a twentieth century state without an advanced
telecommunications system would be as competitively disadvantaged as a late
nineteenth century state without a railroad."'"
3. Education and Training
Scarce financial65 and personal resources could be spent more efficiently
on education by taking advantage of economies of scale and expanding the
opportunities offered to tomorrow's students through the use of local fiber optic
networks.66 Significant advances in educational opportunities could be made
with a broadband interactive video and voice hookup between schools. 67 For
example, well-funded schools could share expensive experts and highly motivat-
ing instructors with those school districts which are under-funded. Other school
districts face shortages in qualified teachers.6" Broadband networks, directly
connected to schools, could provide students with highly qualified teachers who
might be reluctant to go into an inner-city environment or to travel great
distances to teach. Local fiber optic networks will provide the transmission
61. "The increasing role of telecommunications in business can be traced to fundamental forces in the
business environment, including the increasing intensity with which businesses use information and
communications and the increasing importance of telecommunications-intensive industries in New Jersey
and the nation's economy:" 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, § 5, at 112.
62. Area Development magazine conducted a survey of the importance of factors in business location
decisions. The availability of telecommunication services was ranked very important or important by 78.1%
of the respondents in 1989, up 14.2% from the 1988 responses. Id. at 7. "James Schriner, Director of
Industrial Location Advisor Services for PHH Fantus Corporation, noted in his analysis of the 1989 Area
Development survey results, 'we see developments in telecommunications ... having the most important
impact on location decision-making over the next decade."' Id. at 8.
63. Id. at §5, 30.
64. Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
65. The total annual spending on both public and private education, elementary through secondary,
was only $189.1 billion in 1990. Lattner et al., supra note 28, at 110.
66. "A significant opportunity exists to advance the public agenda for excellence in education through
improvements to the telecommunications infrastructure." 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, §6, at 66.
67. Id. at 63.
68. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 51.
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capabilities that could bridge the gap between rich and poor schools and
provide better educational opportunities for students in disadvantaged or rural
school systems.69
The creation of a telecommunications classroom7 would make highly
advanced courses affordable and available when only a few students in any one
location are interested.would make highly advanced courses affordable and
available when only a few students in any one location are interested." Some
distance learning programs now exist,72 but their lack of interactive abilities
may be unacceptable. This deficiency has caused an under-utilization of
distance programs.7 3 Local fiber optic networks can overcome the limitation of
copper facilities and provide the type of interactive environment educators have
described as necessary for the success of distance programs.74
Higher education will benefit from local broadband networks as well. There
has been substantial investment in computer and super-computer networks that
connect universities, academics, and students with data and processing pow-
er.75 Local fiber networks will allow an even more diverse population to receive
the benefits of these networks.76 Industry and business, through local fiber
networks, will be able to access this computing power and establish closer links
to university research. As personal computers grow more powerful and optical
69. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 60. See also 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note
15, § 6, at 1-6.
70. A telecommunications classroom would be composed of a few students in separate school facilities
from a widely dispersed geographical area all receiving interactive instruction at the same time.
71. 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, §6, at 63.
72. Recently, the use of distance learning programs appears to be increasing:
According to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), as recently as 1987, fewer than 10
states were investing in distance learning. By the end of 1989, virtually all states were involved
to some degree in distance learning projects. In 1990, roughly one-third of all school districts in
the United States were using distance learning.
NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 50. These figures, however, relate to broadcast-type
technologies, not interactive situations.
73. 2 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, § 6, at 64.
74. Interaction education, according to one report, requires substantial transmission rates:
The nature of interaction over an educational network should replicate as closely as possible
the "live," instructor-led classroom experience. At a minimum, educational networks must
be able to support one-way full-motion video transmission, as well as data and voice.... As
distance learning matures, the demand for two-way interactive video will increase, and
networks must evolve to support this demand.
Id.
75. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 47-51.
76. For example:
Just as consumers and businesses get their electricity from the grid network of the nation's
utility companies, home and business computer users may one day be able to plug into a
national computing network and draw off as much processing power as they need.
'Supercomputing is on the verge of becoming a utility,' said David Farber, a professor of
computing and information sciences at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. 'You
may want more computing power for a very short period of time. In the future, without even
asking, your computer will reach out over high-speed computing networks to get that power.
John Markoff, A Crucial Linkup in the U.S. Data Highway, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1992, at D8.
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optical computer processing draws closer, the need for local fiber optic net-
works to connect distant processing units becomes more imperative.
Another key component of education is continued training of the work
force. Employers spent $210 billion in 1990 on both formal and informal
training of their employees.77 "As oil prices increase, the motivation to use
communication instead of transportation increases. Distance education and
training are expected to increase in cost effectiveness .... Residential
education and training has the potential to generate service demands that
overlap the business market.""8 Local fiber networks will make training at
home an effective alternative to distant educational seminars, thus reducing
employee fatigue and wasted travel time and expense.
4. Entertainment
Some industry observers believe that local fiber networks will result in a
"brave new world of devices," with many of the developments focused on
leisure activities.79 Two illustrative examples of near-term information services
are "home video services on demand [and] on-line multimedia libraries that
would integrate written text with video images and data."8 Another emerging
entertainment service will be multi player and virtual reality games. "Multi-
player games appear to be gaining momentum. If low-cost, high-performance
[broadband] residential communications services were available, it is plausible
that the $4 billion video game and arcade industry could roll out game services
where multiple players could ... access ... different multi-player game[s]." l
Local fiber networks create limitless potential for the development of entertain-,
ment-oriented information services.
5. Health Care
As health care costs continue to rise and many members of society cannot
afford adequate health care, local broadband networks will reduce costs and
provide access to the services of highly-qualified specialists. Local fiber systems
will connect expensive and hard-to-reach specialists by transmitting patient
images to distant locations for diagnosis. 82 Using fiber networks, a poor
77. Lattner et al., supra note 28, at 110.
78. Id.
79. Andrews, supra note 35, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Lattner et al., supra note 28, at 111.
82. This has already been tested using over satellite transmission links. A suburban Philadelphia
orthopedic clinic transmits its x-rays to the University of Pennsylvania Hospital. The remote access to the
University's radiology department eliminates the need for and cost of a full time radiologist at the clinic.
NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 66. Broadband networks are particularly appropriate for
transmitting highly detailed diagnostic images that require transmission rates of hundreds of mega-bits per
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patient in an average medical facility could take advantage of a specialist's
expertise thousands of miles away. 3 A central computer and processing unit
could operate remote diagnostic imaging and interface equipment using the
capabilities of local fiber networks. Health care in economically disadvantaged
or rural locations would improve because communities that could not afford
advanced diagnostic equipment might be able to afford less expensive imaging
equipment that would use a distant processing center.' Furthermore, the use
of a shared specialized physician, to review diagnostic images, would reduce
costs. In certain areas, this might be the only way patients could receive
specialized care because of the shortage of health care professionals.
Local fiber networks connecting medical data bases could provide immedi-
ate, emergency access to patient records located at considerable distances. In
emergency situations, primary care physicians could be consulted from remote
locations with high quality interactive video images and vital data. Local fiber
networks would allow home monitoring devices to transmit significant amounts
of detailed information and allow interactive communications with homebound
patients.85 Local fiber networks will also benefit advanced research
applications in medical treatment programs. For example, at the University of
North Carolina Medical Center, a Cray super-computer will be connected to
the hospital by an optical fiber. The computer will be used to focus laser
treatments for tumor patients without the hospital incurring the purchase cost
of a computer with the required processing power.8 6
The administrative costs of health care could also be reduced through the
use of local broadband networks. Health care providers could be directly
connected to insurance providers via the fiber network, which would result in
lower costs of claims processing.87 For example, a program in Connecticut
allowed Blue Cross to receive twenty percent of its claims electronically. This
experiment has "accelerated processing times, reduced errors, and saved the
second.
83. This could also mean training a local physician via remote initerface systems connected by local
fiber networks. "Electronic imaging systems will be employed on a larger scale in the 1990s. Video-based
systems, currently employed on a limited basis in approximately one-sixth of all hospitals for distance
education, could evolve to routine video-consultation capabilities." 3 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15,
§ 7, at 63.
84. For example, the imaging elements of a magnetic resonance imaging device could be controlled
by a distant computer communicating over high-speed fiber links. The local optical fibers would carry both
the controlling, signals to the interface unit and the data back to the central processor. "In Memphis,
Tennessee, three hospitals are using a fiber optic network to share computer and diagnostic equipment,
including a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine." NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note
9, at 67. See also 3 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, § 7, at 62.
85. "[Djoctors will not have to walt for regularly scheduled office visits to gain an awareness of
changing patient conditions." 3 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, § 7, at 63-4.
86. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 68.
87. "For example, according to one study, administration expenses [of medical records) comprised
between 19.3 and 24.1 percent of total U.S. health care costs in 1987, a 37 percent increase (in 'real' terms)
from 1983." Id. at 64.
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firm some $300,000 annually in administrative costs."88 These are only a few
of the medical advantages possible with the development of local broadband
networks. A study of telecommunications opportunities in New Jersey health
care concluded that "[an advanced telecommunications infrastructure could
help accelerate the use of advanced technologies within health care and help
ensure the associated improvements in' service efficiency and quality."89
6. Telecommuting
Telecommuting, working at home or remotely via telecommunications,
promises to enhance the quality of life for the American work force as well as
to increase its performance and productivity.' The environmental benefits
from telecommuting are particularly significant." "President Bush has pointed
out, for instance, that if only five percent of the commuters in Los Angeles
county would telecommute one day a week, they would keep 47,000 tons of
pollutants from entering the atmosphere."92 The potential social and economic
benefits are equally great.93
Through telecommuting, companies could tap the expertise of individuals
who need or desire to spend more time at home. The care of small children is
one reason for relocation of a worker to the home, but, as our population
continues to age, there will be a greater demand on employees to provide care
and companionship for aging parents. Firms will benefit economically by
retaining experienced workers and by reducing overhead expenses.94 In the
fall of 1992, Bell Atlantic gave more than 16,000 managers the option to
telecommute several days a week. A spokesman said "the company had seen
'dramatic increases in employee productivity' during two [telecommuting] test
programs."95  The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration Infrastructure Report concluded "that greater use of
telecommuting can generate unquestionable economic and social benefits for
U.S. business and citizens. '96 Local broadband networks would allow an
extensive development of work-at-home programs and stimulate innovation in
88. Id. at 65.
89. 3 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 15, § 7, at 65.
90. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 73.
91. "[Alccording to one study, some 25 percent of all U.S. motor fuel consumption and 11 percent
of our total petroleum consumption in 1979 were attributable to the commute from home to work and back."
Id. at 75.
92. Id. at 74.
93. "[A] study by Arthur D. Little, Inc.... estimates that substituting telecommunications for certain
transportation activities could save the U.S. economy some $23 billion annually (measured in 1988 dollars).
Most of these savings represent the avoidance of productivity losses that currently result from business travel
and traffic congestion." Id. at 74-75.
94. Id. at 76.
95. Bell Atlantic Gives Managers A Telecommuting Option, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at D5.
96. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 79.
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the CPE industry to provide enhanced features to those choosing to telecom-
mute.
D. Summary
Local fiber optic networks will become the super-highways of information
exchange in the next century. The principles of physics that explain the
enormous capacity of fiber also demonstrate that neither copper nor coaxial
facilities can ever achieve fiber optics' capacity for information transmission.
Thus, it is crucial to develop a new regulatory philosophy that will encourage
the construction of local fiber optic networks and the development of broadband
information services.
II. Regulatory History of Telecommunications
Although past regulatory policy will not be sufficient to govern this new
technology, reference to past regulatory practices in the telecommunications
industry will be helpful in developing a new regulatory philosophy for local
broadband networks. This Part sketches some economic justifications for
governmental intervention in the marketplace and outlines the regulatory
structure under which the telecommunications industry developed. Then it
highlights recent judicial, legislative, and regulatory actions affecting local
telecommunication networks and proposes guidelines to determine future
regulatory policy in the area of price regulation. Since this Article focuses on
local networks, only telecommunication issues directly affecting local networks
will be discussed in detail.
97
A. Competition, Market Failures, and Monopoly
It is widely accepted that competition allocates resources better than
exhaustive regulation of the marketplace.98 Over one hundred years ago the
97. For a discussion of regulation in the telecommunications industry before AT&T's divestiture, see
Paul MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on
Telecommunications, I YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983) [hereinafter, Winning By Losing]; MacAvoy & Robinson,
Losing By Judicial Policy making, supra note 21, at 225; Robert W. Crandall, Halfway Home: U.S.
Telecommunications (De)Regulation in the 1970s and 1980s, in REGULATION, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
HISTORY 77 (Jack High ed. 1991).
98. "The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market
recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety and durability-and not just the immediate
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers." National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). Adam Smith wrote:
[H]e intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his
106
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United States Congress passed legislation to ensure that the national economic
policy promoted competitive marketplaces. 9 Since then, the Supreme Court
has vigorously upheld this congressional mandate. 1°°
Regulation affects technological progress. Professor Jack High argues, "[a]s
a consequence of altered profit opportunities, technology may develop
differently in the regulated environment than in the competitive
environment."'0 ' Historical observations show that pervasive government
regulation can be destructive as well as inefficient, particularly in areas of
technological innovation. °2
When competition is lacking in a marketplace, the government may choose
to regulate industries to protect social welfare.0 3 Theoretically, a monopolistic
market failure arises when a single producer's economies of scale exist over
the entire range of relevant demand.1"a Many industry observers describe
traditional local telecommunication networks as inherently monopolistic, lacking
in any competitive pressure.0" Others conclude that governmental regulation
itself created a monopoly in the telecommunications industry.' °6
own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it.
ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477-78 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).
99. The Congress passed antitrust legislation in 1890 now known as the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1992).
100. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695; Carnation Co. v, Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218
(1966); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 675 (1964). Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
101. Jack High, Introduction: A Tale of Two Disciplines, in REGULATION ECONOMIC THEORY AND
HISTORY 1, 16 (Jack High ed. 1991).
102. In an analysis of regulation and technology in electric utilities professor Richard Hirsh wrote:
"Restrained by more traditional regulation ... utilities must still act in a risk-averse manner that may hinder
technological advanes .... In many cases, [electric utilities] refuse to build new technologies because of
regulatory risk." Richard F. Hirsh, Regulation and Technology in the Electric Utility Industry: A Historical
Analysis of Interdependence and Change, in REGULATION ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 147, 171 (Jack
High ed. 1991). Professor Hirsh continues:
In contrast, technological innovation on the deregulated side of power production has been
daring. R&D efforts in cogeneration technologies, for example, have thrived as numerous
small power equipment companies join the large firms to cater to a growing market. Other
technologies have also been advanced rapidly in the deregulated environment.
Id at 172.
103. "The purpose of regulation is to ensure socially desirable outcomes when competition cannot be
relied upon to achieve them. Regulation replaces the invisible hand of competition with direct intervention -
with a visible hand, so to speak." KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPrIMAL REGULATION 2 (1991).
104. Id. at 5. See also Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, II J.L. & Econ. 55, 56 (1968).
105. "The very reason for the regulation of private utility rates--by state bodies and by the
Commission-is the inevitability of a monopoly that requires price control to take the place of price
competition." Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973) (Stewart, J. concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
106. "[Tlelecommunications is an 'unnatural monopoly,' that is, a monopoly put in place by
government decree." HIGH, supra note 101, at I1, 15-16.
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B. The Telephone System
Before divestiture, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
("AT&T") operated virtually the entire country's telephone system. AT&T
"supplied ... approximately eighty-five percent of local phone service and,
through its Long Lines department, approximately ninety percent of all domestic
and international long-distance service."'' 7 In 1949, the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) filed suit against AT&T for monopolization and conspiracy to
restrain trade in the telecommunications industry.'08 In January of 1956,
AT&T and the DOJ entered into a consent decree that, among other things,
limited AT&T to the "provision of common carrier communications servic-
es.'1°9 In November 1974, the DOJ filed a separate antitrust action against
AT&T."' Pretrial proceedings continued with intermittent regularity for seven
years until the trial began on January 15, 1981."' On January 8, 1982, the
DOJ and AT&T filed a stipulation with the District Court of New Jersey called
the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ)." 2 Two years after the MFJ,
AT&T officially divested itself of all local operations." 3
Since this analysis focuses on local broadband networks, our concern with
the MFJ is its effect on the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) and their
subsidiaries that provide local information transmission and services. In relevant
part, the BOC restrictions, as set forth in the MFJ, are stated as follows:
[N]o BOC shall, directly or through any affiliated enterprise:
1. provide interexchange telecommunications services or information
services;
2. manufacture or provide telecommunications products or customer
premises equipment... or
3. provide any other product or service, except exchange telecommuni-
cations and exchange access service, that is not a natural monopoly
service actually regulated by tariff."
4
107. MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning By Losing, supra note 97, at 3. Non-AT&T local exchange
carriers consisted "of 1,500 or so rural telephone companies, which serve[d] about twenty-five percent of
the country's geographical area but less than four percent of total households." Id. at 3-4.
108. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982).
109. Id. at 138.
110. Id. at 139.
111. Id. at 140.
112. Id. at 140-41.
113. MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policy making, supra note 21, at 225. "Divestiture
yielded not only a scaled down AT&T, with some 370,000 employees and approximately $33 billion in
1984 revenues, but also [created the BOCs] each with about 100,000 employees and about $10 billion in
projected revenues" which provided, through their subsidiaries, about eighty-five percent of America's local
telephone service. Id. at 235.
114. United States v. AT&T, at 227-28. The MFJ defined informative service as follows:
"Information service" means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information which may be
108
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Under the terms of the MFJ, Federal District Judge Harold Greene retained
jurisdiction to hear triennial reviews of the restrictions he placed on the BOCs'
ability to enter certain lines of business." 5 The BOCs and DOJ petitioned
Judge Greene to modify the MFJ, arguing that the restrictions imposed
abnormally high transaction costs up6n the highly innovative and quickly
changing local telecommunications industry." 6 As a result of these petitions,
the ban on the BOCs' ability to transmit information services originated by
other business entities, was lifted."17 However, the BOCs appealed Judge
Greene's decision because they believed the restrictions left in place were
unnecessary."' The appellate court remanded the matter, instructing Judge
Greene to reconsider the prohibition that restricted the BOCs from originating
information services themselves.'
On July 25, 1991, Judge Greene lifted the information services ban, allow-
ing the BOCs to provide information services.1a° However, Judge Greene
found the BOCs had market power in the information services marketplace. 2'
Therefore, he lifted the ban under heavy protest and only in deference to the
higher court.'22 To clarify the appellate court's intentions, Judge Greene im-
posed a stay of his order pending the appellate court's review. 23 The Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the stay, allowing the local telephone
companies to enter the information marketplace."2 On October 30, 1991, the
Supreme Court denied an application to reinstate the stay.'
25
On July 16, 1992, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted
a rule that allows local telephone companies to transmit video programming
to their customers. 2 6 However, the FCC's action was constrained by the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (1984 Cable Act),'27 which bars
conveyed via telecommunications, except that such service does not include any use of any
such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or
the management of a telecommunications service.
Id. at 229.
115. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
116. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
117. Id. at 587-97.
118. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
119. Id. at 305.
120. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 327 (D.D.C. 1991).
121. Id. at 317.
122. Id. at 327-28.
123. Id. at 332-33.
124. "The record does not contain sufficient evidence of probability that the order will be reversed
..... United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,610 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1991).
125. American Newspaper Publishers Assoc. v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 366 (1991).
126. This is also known as video dial tone. in the Matter of Telephone Company-Cable Television
Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 5781 (1992). See also Edmund L. Andrews, F.C.C. Approves TV
on Phone Lines, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1992, at D5; Edmund L. Andrews, Telephone Companies to Get Right
to Transmit Television, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 1992, at Al.
127. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (1991).
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local telephone companies' ownership of video programming.'28 Nevertheless,
the FCC's decision is of critical significance for industry participants. Under
the Act's regulations, cable television's estimated annual revenues for 1992 are
twenty billion dollars. 29 The profit potential is particularly important as a
financial incentive to encourage local phone companies to construct local fiber
optic networks to carry television signals.
Senator Albert Gore offered a suggestion for lifting the ban on telephone
company ownership of television programming. He proposed an agreement to
lift the cross-ownership "ban in exchange for a commitment from phone compa-
nies to complete their fiber optic networks by 2015."'10 This trade-off might
be interpreted as a government choice of the local phone companies as the
preferred local broadband transmission developers, insulating them from
competitive pressures. This proposal would quicken the development of a local
fiber optic network infrastructure but since it fails to promote other developers,
the beneficial effects of competition would be lost.
On September 17, 1992, the FCC voted to expand local telephone competi-
tion by permitting small telecommunications companies to interconnect with
local telephone networks so they could compete directly with the established
local telephone companies. 3' The FCC's Common Carrier Bureau Chief,
Cheryl A. Tritt, said, "The possibilities of the commission's action today are
mind boggling."' 3 2 This FCC action takes an important step towards local
telecommunications competition, but its true potential cannot be realized unless
all regulators of the local telecommunications industry are guided by a unifying
philosophy. These recent FCC actions favor the development of competitive
local information service and transmission industries. However, because of the
large number of telecommunications policy makers in the U.S., their individual
actions are creating a collage of divergent and ill-fitting laws and regula-
tions. 33 Although the FCC's regulations tend to be quite current, many of
the other regulators use regulatory philosophies that are carryovers from past
128. "Video dialtone contemplates telephone company involvement in the video marketplace, consistent.
with the statutory telephone company-cable television cross-ownership restrictions." 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 5781
(1992). See 47 U.S.C.A. §533(b) (1991). See also Andrews, supra note 126, Telephone Companies to Get
Right to Transmit Television, at D17.
129. Edmund L. Andrews, Senate Sends Bush Bill To Regulate Price Of Cable TV N.Y. TIMES,
September 23, 1992, at Al, D2.
130. Andrews, supra note 126, Telephone Companies to Get Right to Transmit Television, at Dl 7.
131. Expanded Interconnection with local Telephone Company Facilities, Amendment of Part 69
Allocation of General Support Facility Costs Reparation Order and Notice of Proposed Rate Making CC
Docket Nos. 91-141, 92-222, adopted Sept. 17, 1992, released Oct. 19, 1992. FCC No. 29440, 7 F.C.C.
Rcd. _. See also Anthony Ramirez, F.C.C. Acts To Spur Local Competition In Phone Services, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1992, at Al.
132. Ramirez, supra note 131, at D6.
133. For example, Congress first adopted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and then
reversed policy and adopted the new Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.
The FCC has adopted numerous orders, two current ones discussed in supra notes 128 and 131. The
judiciary issued many decisions, a few current ones discussed in supra notes 114-16, 120, 124, 125.
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technological environments that are no longer appropriate, especially when
dealing with the innovative technology of local broadband networks.
C. Regulation of Cable Television'34
Congress has not maintained a consistent policy with respect to the exercise
of control by local telephone companies over cable television franchises and
other regulatory issues. In 1971, Congress required the FCC to oversee
telephone company involvement with cable television.13 5 Congress then
passed the 1984 Cable Act,'36 which streamlined the regulation of cable
television and removed economic impediments to network development.
3 7
One of the 1984 Cable Act's mandates explicitly prohibits local telephone
company ownership of cable television franchises. 3 This burdensome
regulation discourages the integrated development of telephony and video
information services. On July 16, 1992, however, the FCC adopted an order
that exempted local phone companies from this prohibition in municipalities
with fewer than 10,000 residents which were not also served by a cable
television system.'39 In this order, the FCC recommended that Congress
eliminate the ban on cross-ownership altogether."4 Cable television regulation
is a complex subject, to which separate analyses have been devoted to
understanding the extent and division of regulatory authority.'4 ' The primary
134. In 1992, cable television systems pass ninety percent of U.S. homes and provide service to nearly
sixty percent, approximately fifty-eight million subscribers. Mary Lu Carnevale, How Cable Bill Will
Influence Rates, Service, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1992, at B1, B 11. See also Competition, Rate Deregulation
and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 F.C.C. Rcd. 4962,
4966-67, 5039 (1990). Cable television sales have grown from $2.5 billion in 1980 to nearly $20 billion
in 1992. Andrews, supra note 129, at Al.
135. In General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971), the court held
the FCC could issue rules restricting the BOC's involvement with cable television companies based on the
."public convenience and necessity" standard of 47 U.S.C.A. § 214 (1991). Id. at 858.
136. 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (1991).
137. Among its objectives in passing the Cable Act, Congress purported to "establish a national policy
concerning cable communications" and to "minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue
economic burden on cable systems." 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521(1), 521(6) (1991). The Act was also intended to
"establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with respect to the regulation
of cable systems" through procedures and standards that "encourage the growth and development of cable
systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local
community." 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521(3), 521(2) (1991). New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 61 (1988).
138. 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b)(1) (1991). Congress and the FCC were concerned that BOCs would exclude
other companies from owning and operating cable television systems. Their belief was that "[slince the
telephone companies have a natural monopoly over the means required to conduct a CATV operation, i.e.,
the poles or conduits, they are in a position to pre-empt the market for this important service." General Tel.
Co. of Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d at 856.
139. 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 5781, 5784 (1992). This order raises the residential cut-off from 2,500 to 10,000.
See also Andrews, supra note 126, Telephone Companies to Get Right to Transmit Television, at D17.
140. 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 5781, 5784 (1992). See also Andrews, supra note 136, F.C.C. Approves TV on
Phone Lines, at D5.
141. See, e.g., Robert F. Copple, Cable Television and the Allocation of Regulatory Power: A Study
of Govermnental Demarcation and Roles, 44 FED. COMM, L.J. 1 (1991).
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consideration of this Article is which cable television regulations will affect the
development of local broadband networks.
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(1992 Cable Act) served to re-regulate the cable television industry. 42 The
important question is how this new law will effect competitive development
in local information and transmission markets. The 1992 Cable Act allows cities
to continue to collect five percent of gross revenues as a cable television
franchise fee. 43 Additionally, the FCC must establish 'reasonable' rate tiers
for basic service and consumer equipment.'" While the localities will actually
set the regulated price, 45 the price of premium and special interest channels
will remain unregulated. It was reported that "[i]n the sixty five cities that allow
competition, prices have fallen by twenty to twenty five percent."'' 46 However,
the ability to regulate rates and obtain a five percent franchise fee gives clear
incentives for localities to keep gross revenues high. 47 Therefore, the 1992
Cable Act may cause local authorities to discourage competitive entry into local
cable television markets in an attempt to keep revenues high through high
franchise fees.
Other significant provisions of the 1992 Cable Act allow "over-the-air
television broadcasters to demand royalties from cable companies for carrying
their programs."' 14 The law restricts exclusive franchises by requiring locali-
ties "not to 'unreasonably deny' a second franchise and prohibits discriminatory
pricing among customers."'' 49 The 'program access' provision requires "large
cable companies that also produce popular programming to license their materi-
al on the same terms and conditions to [other] companies;" in short, it blocks
exclusive licenses. 5 ° Another provision of the 1992 Cable Act requires cable
television companies to make every customer location individually address-
able. "' Furthermore, while the act allows a ten year period to complete this
cable television network improvement, it also allows cable companies to obtain
a waiver of the requirement.'52 Subscriber ownership of customer premises
142. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385 (to
be codified) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
143. 47 U.S.C.A. § 541 (b) (1991) remains unchanged by the 1992 Cable Act. See also Sen. Conrad
Bums and Rep. Norman F. Lent, Bill Could Entrench Cable-TV Monopolies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1992,
at A14. The Great Cable TV Battle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1992, at A14.
144. Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Rejects Bill That Would Limit Rates On Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1992, at Al, A30. Camevale, supra note 134, at BII.
145. Carnevale, supra note 134, at B 11.
146. The Great Cable TV Battle, supra note 143, at A14.
147. id.
148. Andrews, supra note 144, at A30.
149. Bums & Lent, supra note 143, at A14.
150. Andrews, supra note 144, at A30.
151. The cable television company must develop the ability to send a specific video program to a
unique customer. This ability is analogous to the telephone system's ability to ring one customer's telephone




equipment, prohibition of exclusive franchises, and mandatory program
licensing could encourage competition in local information and transmission
marketplaces. 153 Other provisions, such as franchise fees, obstacles to
exclusive licenses, and continued prohibition of telephone company
participation, could discourage competition. The 1992 Cable Act is focused on
the cable television industry and ignores the possibility of consumer rate
protection accomplished through encouraging competition from other industries,
particularly local telephone companies. The 1992 Cable Act could have
removed the barriers from BOC involvement in television programming and
encouraged competitive local transmission networks. Removal of these barriers
would have produced lower prices and better service through competition rather
than direct price regulation.
D. Pricing in Non-Competitive Markets
In both the telephone and cable television industry, one of the policy
makers' primary concerns has been price regulation. If a particular marketplace
fails to allocate prices satisfactorily through competitive mechanisms, direct
price regulation is often instituted. 55 The battle over the 1992 Cable Act is
evidence that when consumer costs go up and there is no competitive alterna-
tive, price regulation often results.
The goal of any price regulation is to obtain near optimal pricing. Rate-of-
return regulation' 56 historically dominated the telecommunications industry.
Experience indicates that certain forms of price regulation do not work
well.'5 7 Professor Train has written, rate-of-return "regulation provides
153. "Wall Street analysts believe the bill will have little effect, if any, on cable revenues or cash flows.
In fact, they see many new opportunities for cable companies, including using their fiber optic equipment
to carry phone calls and eventually offering wireless pocket-phone service to consumers." Id.
154. "(Representative Edward Markey, sponsor of the bill] said rate regulation is merely an interim
measure, and that what is really needed to bring prices down is more competition in the cable industry."
Edmund L. Andrews, Cable TV Regulation Battle Heats Up Before Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992,
at Dl.
155. For example, refer to the re-regulation of cable television prices by the 1992 Cable Act.
156. "Under rate-of-return (ROR) regulation, the firm is allowed to earn no more than a 'fair' rate of
return on its capital investment. The firm is free to chose its price, output level, and inputs as long as its
profits do not exceed this fair rate." TRAIN, supra note 103, at 20.
157, The Averch-Johnson model explains the poor results of rate-of-return regulation:
Averch and Johnson (1962) initiated one of the earliest and most influential investigations
into the effects of regulation on the behavior of a regulated firm. They argue that the most
prevalent form of regulation currently applied to public utilities, rate-of-return regulation,
induces the firm to engage in inefficiencies. These inefficiencies are the natural result of the
regulation, in that a firm that is attempting to maximize profits is given, by the form of the
regulation itself, incentives to be inefficient. Furthermore, the aspects of monopoly control
that regulation is intended to address, such as high prices, are not necessarily mitigated, and
could be made worse, by the regulation.
TRAIN, supra note 103, at 19. The Averch-Johnson model has been criticized as being flawed. However,
the identified errors "do not affect [Averch and Johnson's] essential conclusions." Id.
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perverse incentives that operate against optimality."' 5 8 In certain geographical
areas, competition among producers may not develop in either the information
services or information transmission market. Therefore, in these geographical
areas, policy makers should consider past experience with price regulation but
also adopt innovative approaches.
A recent example of an innovative approach is a telecommunications bill
in New Jersey that proposed the public utilities board "shall not be limited to
rate base, rate of return regulation."'' 59 An innovative feature of the New
Jersey proposal was that the form of price regulation would be designed by
regulators familiar with the industry rather than legislators. Another alternative
method uses price-caps rather than specific rates. There are many other new
proposals for methods of rate regulation. 6°
This Article will not address the best policy for price regulation; a separate
discussion is needed to consider and evaluate new proposals. This Article does
propose three requirements for direct price regulation in non-competitive
markets. First, the choice and structure of direct price regulation must
encourage prospective entrants to produce in the marketplace. Second, the
regulation must be designed to be withdrawn once competitive producers are
present. Finally, the pricing structure for information transmission must be
distinct from information services pricing.
III. Economic Analysis of Local Fiber Optic Networks
Local broadband networks will possess a unique economic character in the
history of local telecommunications regulation. Therefore, in devising a policy
to govern fiber optic networks, it is essential to understand the ways in which
these networks differ in economic operation from other local telecommunication
networks.
This Part outlines the underlining economics of emerging local fiber
networks so a proper philosophical framework can be constructed. Competitive
broadband information services should develop as a result of opportunities to
provide consumers with a broad range of services using fiber optic transmission.
As fiber networks become less expensive to construct and install, competition
among transmission providers will evolve naturally in some geographical
areas. 6' Given the enormous economic potential of local fiber network
158. Id., at 20.
159. Assembly Res. No. 5063, 205th Sess., N.J., (introduced June 27, 1991), at §3(a).
160. An informative survey of alternative regulatory structures already implemented can be found in
Mary Nagelhout, Incentive Regulation of Local Exchange Telephone Carriers, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 1,
1991, at 46.
161. There are many examples of competitive systems being planned and developed. See, e.g., Richard
Karpinski, 'ALTs' Joust on ComForum Panel, TELEPHONY, Nov. 4, 1991, at 22 (discussing competition
in local markets throughout the nation); Carla Lazzareschi, Local Phone Companies Brace Themselves for
New Competition, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at DI (discussing proposed plan to allow competition in the
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development, the fixed costs traditionally considered a barrier to market entry
of competing firms may not impede the development of most local broadband
networks. 62 In non-competitive markets, the natural monopoly model should
be considered. Close attention must be paid to issues of cross-subsidization in
order to protect free entry and competition in the marketplace.
A. Economics of Broadband Information Services
Broadband transmission systems can deliver an enormous range of services
from different producers. Thus, competitive information services are likely to
develop. The history of technological innovation suggests that once local
broadband networks are installed, many new information services will emerge.
For example, there was no reason to develop electrical devices until an
infrastructure provided customers with electrical power. A secondary market
developed for all types of electrical appliances once consumers were connected
to electric power lines. Similarly, once local fiber networks are operating,
consumer demand will provide an impetus for the provision of many new and
innovative information services. The large potential profits for transmission
providers may help explain the development of competitive broadband transmis-
sion facilities already occurring.
163
B. Economics of Local Broadband Transmission Networks
Local broadband networks will succeed both the local telephone and cable
television networks. Recent economic analyses place the cost of installing local
fiber links to customers at parity with installing new copper wire facilities."
Other estimates suggest that construction of local fiber networks is now
California phone market); Ann H. Lindstrom, ICC Chairman Sets the Stage for Local Exchange Competition,
TELEPHONY, Dec. 2, 1991, at 8 (discussing a proposed regulatory change in Chicago that could result in
all-out competition in local exchange services); Deborah Pfeiffer, Alternative Access: Searching for CO
Treasures, TELEPHONY, Dec. 2, 1991, at S38 (discussing companies providing competitive local telephone
access); J.B. Pierpoint, Metropolitan Fiber to Press C&Pfor Downtown Access, WARFIELD'S Bus. REC.,
Feb. 28, 1992, §1, at 3 (discussing entry of competitor in Baltimore); Will Bypass Companies' Fight With
RBOCs Result in 1990 Divestiture, LONG DISTANCE LETTER, April, 1990, at 6 (discussing competition in
local markets throughout the nation).
162. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the
Cable TV Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1364-75 (1986) (arguing that cable is probably not a natural
monopoly); Note, Access to Cable, Natural Monopoly, and the First Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1663,
1678 n.82 (1986).
163. As long ago as 1985, when telephone lines were beginning to connect the growing number of
customer computers and facsimile devices, MacAvoy and Robinson suggested that "establishing competition
for local [telephone] service [was] economically justified." MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial
Policymaking, supra note 21, at 247.
164. John Harrison, Economic Considerations of Broadband Development, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 21,
1990, at 51; Lattner et al., supra note 28, at 112; Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at 72.
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economically justified.' It must be remembered, however, that although
economic comparisons between fiber, telephone, and cable television transmis-
sion systems are appropriate, viewing fiber optics as simply an upgrade to the
current telecommunications infrastructure would be a gross underestimate of
its potential.
1. Telephony
Recent technological developments suggest that although some local
telephone networks are "predominantly characterized by a single monopoly
carier, ' ' 16 certain geographical areas are becoming open to competition.'
67
Mobile communication systems will compete with local telephone companies
for fixed transmission customers. 168 Increased accessibility to the current
telephony marketplace coincided with the expansion of information services,
such as computer data transfer, facsimile, voice message storage, and caller
identification, available over the telephone transmission facilities. The scale and
type of information services available to the consumer will affect demand for
connectivity to fiber networks. Emerging competition also may be driven by
the downward spiral of the fixed costs associated with expanding construction
of fiber networks and the resulting increase in demand for new fiber
products. 1
69
165. "Technology is rapidly reducing costs .... The start up cost for new technology is frequently
less than the marginal cost for the old." G. Lawrence Cashion, Local Optical Interconnection Developments
in the NYNEX Region, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y AND REG., Oct. 9, 1990, at 21. "Although it is not
a universal view, analyses by vendors and others indicate that the cost of integrated delivery of telephony
and cable television is less and the quality higher than for. separate delivery over today's independent
networks." Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at 71.
166. Andrew Barrett, Public Policy and the Advanced Intelligent Network, 42 FED. COMM. L. J. 413,
426 (1990).
167. "For example, there are now multiple providers of inter exchanged access and local dedicated
circuits for business customers in dense urban areas .... purely private networks ... have experienced
rapid growth . . . . In certain limited geographic areas, however, we have witnessed the sprouting of
competition." Id. "[Alt the time of the [AT&T-Department of Justice] settlement.., local telephone service
did not constitute a 'natural monopoly.' Competition existed at the local level between the BOCs and other
service providers. This competition, on the fringe of the traditional switched-voice telephone business, has
continued to grow." MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policymaking, supra note 21, at 255-56.
See Barrett, supra note 166, at 414 n.6 (specific applications to state public utility boards for permission
to compete).
168. "Baby Bells fear that AT&T will steal away their local phone business. As AT&T expands
wireless communication, more and more people will be making cellular local calls directly through AT&T,
bypassing the regional companies." Carnevale, supra note 36, at BI. Mr. Robert E. Allen, AT&T's chairman,
said, "McCaw will put AT&T into competition with its former regional Bell companies for the first time
since the government dictated breakup of the big telephone utlity in 1984." John J. Keller, Cellular Move
Underscores AT&T's Transformation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1992, at BI.
169. The downward cost spiral is evident as demand for the elements of a fiber optic transmission
facility allow producers to develop economies of scale. As research and development continue, new methods
for increased cost efficiency in production and design of constituent elements will emerge and also will drive





The secondary markets created by fiber optic transmission facilities renders
local fiber optic networks more closely analogous to local telephone companies
than to power or water utilities. Power lines transmit only electrical current and
water mains carry only water. These two utility transmission facilities are
inexorably tied to delivering one indivisible good to the secondary market. In
contrast, broadband transmission facilities will deliver numerous and distinct
services to the secondary market. 7 ' This potential for a secondary market in
diverse information services highlights the need for separate regulatory
treatment of broadband transmission, particularly if direct price regulation is
required for information services.
3. Non-Competitive Markets
Where high potential profits and an expanding consumer base are not
present, natural monopolies will be the appropriate economic model.
Economically depressed areas, rural zones, and regions with few information
intensive businesses may not produce the initial demand necessary for the
development of competitive broadband transmission systems. Some areas may
not even be considered for a primary broadband network. In these geographic
areas, a natural monopoly model should be considered since competitive
broadband systems or competitive information services are absent.
C. Integration and Cross-Subsidization
In the case of a single local broadband network, cross-subsidization would
occur when profits from information transmission are used to lower the price
of information services offered by the same company. In doing so, the
transmitting entity could price its information services below actual cost and
drive competition out of the market. Alternatively, an information service
provider in a monopoly situation could use its monopoly rents to subsidize its
own information transmission. In either case, the subsidized market will lack
competition and incentive for new providers to enter. Further, the price
distortions caused by the subsidization will result in inefficient use of both
transmission and information services.
In some instances the transmission provider may be compelled also to
provide information services from a separate business entity under the same
corporate umbrella. This arrangement would provide economic integration
170. Although electric power can be put to many different uses, it is fundamentally an electrical current.
Telephony, although fundamentally an electrical signal, carries a differentiable good: voice message,
computer data, or facsimile.
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where the stockholders of the transmission developer share in profits derived
from information services. This arrangement might attract the capital necessary
to construct new fiber facilities. 17' Economic integration, even for a natural
monopoly, would not be harmful if separate business entities with separate
accounting books were required.
It is Judge Greene's opinion that the local telephone companies will use
cross-subsidization to eliminate competition in the information services market-
place. "'72 Competitive pressure in the information transmission marketplace
would eliminate the problem. Nevertheless, Judge Greene makes a strong
argument for pressuring the local telephone companies with a regulatory
philosophy that encourages competitors to enter every level of the local tele-
communications marketplace. These concerns highlight the potential problems
with a government policy that establishes the local telephone companies as the
preferred developer of local broadband networks.
1. In a Competitive Marketplace
In a competitive marketplace, where transmission pricing is at marginal cost,
there are no monopoly profits from which a firm can cross-subsidize. The free
market supplies pressure against cross-subsidization without any government
interference.'73 Therefore, if both the transmission and information service
171. There are numerous information services with established consumer demand which could provide
sufficient economic incentives to attract investor capital.
According to federal government surveys, the average household spends 102 percent more
for cable service than phone service. As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the pay-per-view
industry (a perfect broadband application) is expected to gross over $310 million in revenues
in 1989, with only 20 percent of the nation's cable homes equipped to order pay~per-view.
The Journal article noted that a single pay-per-view event can be enormously profitable. In
June of 1989, over 600,000 homeowners each paid $39.95 to watch the Leonard versus Heams
fight. Total revenues generated from this one event exceeded $25.5 million. Hence the market
for entertainment services delivered via broadband could be enormous and may eventually
outperform the business market. One study, as reported in Telephony, estimates the annual
revenue potential for residential broadband to be between $35 and $80 billion with only 50
percent of the U.S. households wired for broadband.
Harrison, supra note 164, at 51.
172. Judge Greene stated on July 25, 1991:
In the opinion of this Court, informed by over twelve years of experience with evidence in
the telecommunications field, the most probable consequences of such entry by the Regional
Companies into the sensitive information services market will be the elimination of
competition from that market and the concentration of the sources of information of the
American people in just a few dominant, collaborative conglomerates, with the captive local
telephone monopolies as their base. Such a development would be inimical to the objective
of a competitive market, the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic well-being of
the American people.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 308, 326 (D.D.C. 1991).
173. As two commentators explain:
Once marginal cost pricing is established, even limited constraints on the development of local
distribution options should be unnecessary. If competitive distribution options can provide
certain services at a lower cost than that associated with conventional telephone plant, such
systems should be developed . . . . The most promising way to alter the views of BOC
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markets are freely competitive, the developer of a broadband network also
should be able to enter the information service industry.
2. In A Non-Competitive Marketplace
The Senate proposed a workable solution to allow economic integration but
prohibit anti-competitive cross-subsidization.'74 The regulation does not direct-
ly interfere with free market price mechanisms, rather it creates a structural
separation. 75 The purpose of allowing separate corporate entities to exist
under a single corporate umbrella is to provide the return on investment capital
that is required for construction.'76 Structural separation also inhibits corporate
entities from engaging in a predatory pricing strategy. This regulatory structure
will allow the most efficient producers to enter the transmission or service
market regardless of their participation in the other.
The structural separation has two main components. First, the policy
requires a corporate entity to operate fully separate subsidiaries. These subsid-
iaries are prohibited from cross-subsidization of any form.'77 Second, the
penalty for cross-subsidization would dissolve the ties between the offending
corporate entities. If cross-subsidization is charged, a swift administrative
proceeding and then an adjudicative session should occur.'78 If the corporate
entity is found guilty of cross-subsidization, immediate and irrevocable divesti-
ture should be ordered.'79 Once robustly competitive marketplaces are
management and state regulators is to reduce the line-of-business restrictions on diversification
by the BOCs contemporaneously with the expansion of local service competition. If the BOCs
can generate revenues from new business ventures they will have less need for protection from
competition in local markets.
MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policymaking, supra note 21, at 257.
174. See S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §652 (1991).
175. See S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §651 (1991).
176. Congressman Boucher stated: "Our bill provides telephone companies with the economic incentive
to modernize the telecommunication infrastructure by allowing them to compete in the cable television
market through a phased lifting of the restrictions which prevent telephone companies from offering cable
TV services in their telephone service areas." The Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure
Modernization Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2546 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) (statement of Rep. Boucher) [hereinafter Boucher statement].
177. The prohibition on cross-subsidization should focus on two forms of anti-competitive advantage:
capital that would allow predatory pricing practices and technical information that would provide super-
competitive advantages and be a mechanism for subverting the prohibition of capital transfer. Thus, the
transmission entity could not pass non-public technical network operation information to the service
provision entity. The structural separation and prohibition on cross-subsidization would prevent captive rate
payers from subsidizing new ventures which fail in the marketplace. Cf Edwin B. Spievack, The Truth
About Telephone Company Diversification, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1986, at 13 (discussing possibility
of regional BOCs from cross-subsidizing non-telecommunications business).
178. The licensing could include a clause whereby the corporate entity's right to run fully separate
subsidiaries is contingent upon binding itself to the jurisdiction of some administrative agency. The enabling
legislation could provide for streamlined agency determination.
179. The accused would have recourse to the judicial system's appellate process. However, this is a
limited review process. Congressman Boucher suggested that it is essential to prohibit cross-subsidizing by
providing a "death penalty, for willful violations of that prohibition, under the terms of which an offending
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established, the prohibition on cross-subsidization could be lifted." Lifting
the ban would allow integration and economies of scale and of scope to
enhance efficiency and innovation. Allowing integration in a fully competitive
marketplace would create optimal pricing as well as a quickened pace of
technical advancement, maximizing social welfare.
D. New Insights
Traditionally, policy makers regarded the local telephone industry and,
lately, the cable television industry, as natural monopolies subject to public
utility regulation. However, the natural monopoly model never may have
accurately reflected reality.' 8 ' This model should not predominate in the for-
mation of a new regulatory philosophy whose purpose is to create local broad-
band networks that will be interconnected to form a nationwide information
super-highway. The new regulatory policy based on the novel philosophy
proposed by this Article must incorporate the following five aspects. First,
policy makers must characterize information transmission separately from the
information services that will be provided through the local fiber networks.
Second, policy makers need to distance themselves from the influence of
presently regulated concerns. Third, competition in both transmission and
information industries must be encouraged. Fourth, the new regulatory policy
should adequately protect free entry into the marketplaces. Finally, vigilant
antitrust examinations must be instituted to preserve competition in both
marketplaces.
E. Summary
The new regulatory philosophy must combine an understanding of both the
economics of fiber optics and the limitations of historical telecommunication
regulations. First, local fiber networks will transmit a vast number of informa-
tion services to the secondary market. Second, diverse customer demand has
telephone company would be required to divest its [offending] subsidiary." Boucher statement, supra note
176.
180. This suggestion assumes that present antitrust laws would be vigorously enforced.
181. Local telephone network competition has existed for nearly a century:
Competition was common and especially persistent in the telephone industry. According to
a special report of the Census in 1902, out of 1051 incorporated cities in the United States
with a population of more than 4,000 persons, 1002 were provided with telephone facilities.
The independent companies had a monopoly in 137 of the cities, the Bell interests had
exclusive control over communication by telephone in 414 cities, while the remaining 451,
almost half, were receiving duplicated service. Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus,
Detroit, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, among the larger
cities, had at least two telephone services in 1905.
Demsetz, supra note 104, at 59 (citing BURTON N. BEHLING, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC
UTILITY INDUSTRIES 19-20 (1938)).
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the potential to create new markets and sizable profits. Third, the economics
of emerging telecommunications technology is making competitive local
transmission networks a reality. Fourth, if actual competitive construction does
not take place, the threat of competition coupled with the downward spiral of
costs and the rapid advancement in new transmission techniques will force sole
transmission providers to function as competitive developers. Most importantly,
the regulatory policy, adopted to encourage development of local broadband
networks, must promote competitive information service providers as well as
competitive transmission providers. This can be accomplished by opening both
new information marketplaces to all potential entrants and preserving a
competitive environment in each.
IV. The Question of Regulatory Authority
Changes in telecommunications policy to encourage the development of
local fiber optics networks will not be effective unless carried out in a coherent
manner. The regulatory body responsible must have the authority to carry out
its responsibility and to maintain the coherence and objectives of the policy.
Thus, this Part will examine the qualifications of the bodies currently active
in telecommunications regulation to implement a new telecommunications
policy which would allow rapid development of local broadband networks..
Current telecommunications regulatory authority is shared by the FCC,
Congress, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, state and local regulatory bodies, 182 and the
judicial system.'83 This uneasy alliance consists of potentially competitive
government entities, each seeking to define its sphere of control and procure
regulatory structures favorable to its particular policy goals. The resulting
tension produces contradictory policies that may deter construction of local
broadband networks, especially competitive ones.
Although competition between regulatory authorities may be subtle, it can
have a detrimental effect on the development of competitive information
services and local transmission networks. For example, the 1992 Cable Act that
re-regulates cable television prices may cause the FCC to shift its resources
from active encouragement of competition in the local telecommunications
industry to the task of defining reasonable cable television rates. What emerges
182. Most states have created regulatory bodies to oversee public utilities, including local exchange
telephone companies and cable television systems. The 1992 Cable Act involves local regulatory bodies
in price regulation.
183. Substantial amounts of litigation concerning telephone communications and cable television
regulation has occurred in the federal courts. Rate payer concerns may be addressed initially by administra-
tive law sessions held by public utility boards. The conflicts arising between state interests in regulatory
control and FCC rule making naturally result in litigation under the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See,
e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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from this review is the distinct absence of a unified policy that could guide the
creation of competitive local broadband networks. Furthermore, the uncertainty
created by the lack of a clear national policy objective, shared by all, or at least
by most, regulatory authorities, to develop such networks will delay, if not
deter, private business's decision to enter either the information transmission
or information services marketplaces.
This Part will explain why two of the bodies heavily involved in
telecommunications regulation, the FCC and the federal courts, lack the
authority and coherence necessary to establish an effective local broadband
policy. This Part will show that Congress must take the initiative to form a new
and unified telecommunications policy, and that Congress can do so despite the
formidable political obstacles.
A. The FCC
Congress created the FCC and granted it certain regulatory authority."94
Courts have interpreted Congress's grant of regulatory authority to the FCC to
be "sufficiently elastic ... such that it could readily accommodate dynamic
new developments in the field of communications."' 85 The FCC's powers
were even interpreted to preempt state regulations in certain circumstances.'86
However, the demarcation between FCC and state agency jurisdiction is not
always clear. Therefore, courts have attempted to clarify this division in
numerous court decisions, establishing a mosaic of directions and directors. The
FCC has issued rules and regulations concerning Open Network Architecture
(ONA)5 7 and advanced network capabilities known as the First, Second and
184. In relevant part, 47 U.S.C.A. § 152(a) (1991) states: "The provisions of this chapter shall apply
to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio." The FCC is empowered to enact any rules
"as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C.A. § 154(i) (1991). See also, General
Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969); Steven M. Spaeth,
The Balance of Interests in Administrative Law and Telecommunications Regulation: Have We Broken the
Scales?, 43 FED. COMM. L. J. 23 (1990).
185. General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir.1971).
186. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492, (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 409 F. Supp. 800 (D.P.R. 1975), (allowing FCC preemption of
state rule making) affd 553 F.2d 701. But see, Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 479 N.E.2d
1057 (1985), aff'd 493 N.E.2d 1045, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Sherdon v. Dann, 229 N.W.2d 531
(1975) (FCC preemption was not recognized).
187. ONA requires local telephone companies to advise all those who wish to provide information
services over their networks of their technical specifications. Thereby, new information services, like
facsimile transmissions, can be designed knowing the technological requirements of the current network.
See Warren G. Lavey, Universal Telecommunications Infrastructure for Information Services, 42 FED.
COMM. L.J. 151 (1990).
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Third Computer Inquiries. 8 Each of the FCC's policy statements has been
litigated and revised by court order.'89
The revisions and alterations of some of the FCC's orders highlight the
deficiency in its current jurisdictional authority to promulgate a coherent and
organized national policy that could reach all the issues critically important to
local broadband network development. This is especially true where those rules
relate to services that have both an interstate and intrastate component. 9 °
Since the FCC derives its jurisdiction, authority, and direction from Congress,
it cannot vest itself with all the authority it needs to set a unified regulatory
policy framework for encouraging competitive local broadband network devel-
opment. Only Congress has the ability to give the FCC the jurisdictional
authority it needs to develop a coherent and organized policy framework that
it can enforce even at local and state levels.
B. The Judiciary
The primary example ofjudicial involvement in telecommunications regula-
tion is the divestiture of AT&T. Perhaps due to Judge Greene's skillful
management of the seemingly unmanageable divestiture case,' 9' the ruling
he entered was affirmed by the Supreme Court, albeit over the dissent of Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White.' 92 However, his subsequent
188. Phase 1 Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986); Phase 1H Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 3072 (1987); Third
Computer Inquiry, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 1150 (1988).
189. The procedural history of the Computer Inquiries includes orders, modifications, reconsiderations,
and petitions for review. See Lavey, supra note 187, at 161 n.30; California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1223
(9th Cir. 1990).
190. The FCC was denied "the power to pre-empt state regulation of depreciation for intrastate
ratemaking purposes." Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 373 (1986). In AT&T v. FCC,
836 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the court found that the FCC's rule requiring refund of earnings in
excess of expected rate of return was "arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act." The court in California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990), held: "(1) that the
FCC's substitution of nonstructural safeguards for the federal structural separation requirements to which
the BOCs were subject was unlawfully arbitrary and capricious; and (2) that the FCC has failed to carry
its burden of showing that its pre-emption orders are necessary to avoid frustrating its regulatory goals."
191. Judge Greene's investigation and hearings were conducted over seven years priorto the 1982 final
judgment. During those seven years AT&T spent some $375 million and assigned 3,000 people to the case.
It leased a building, filling three floors with millions of documents.
Every evening the lawyers for both sides would decide which documents should be presented
to the Judge the next day, following an established agenda. The documents were organized
and photocopied that night, then loaded onto carts to be wheeled to the court room. No fewer
than 300 employees were needed for this daily task.
Judge Greene wanted all the essential documents to pass through his hands. He wanted
to see and hear everything. He wanted to go to the heart of the matter.
JEAN-CLAUDE DERIAN, AMERICAS' STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP IN TECHNOLOGY 215-16 (Severen Schaeffer
trans. 1990). See also Trudy E. Bell, The Decision to Divest: Incredible or Inevitable?, IEEE SPECTRUM,
Nov. 1985, at 50.
192. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.), aff g, United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). The dissent, written by Judge Rehnquist said in part:
several States contend that the decree improperly preempts state regulation of the telephone
industry. They contend their regulation of the industry is "state action" which is exempt from
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142' rulings, memoranda and orders effectively transformed his judicial
chambers into a telecommunication policy office. 94
The Administrative Procedure Act requires the judiciary to play a role in
the regulatory process. 19 5 For example, the FCC lifted certain structural
separation requirements imposed on local telephone companies because it
recognized an evolution in the underlying economics of the enhanced telephone
service market. 9 6 Following the FCC action, the court of appeals invoked
its duty to review the reasonableness of this decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 97 However, the judicial role is better performed when it
interprets laws than when it seeks to design policy through its rulings. 9
the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown. Thus they do not appear to challenge the conclusion
that this consent decree is in the public interest; they claim that the District Court lacked the
authority to override state law by entering this consent decree.... I am troubled by the notion
that a district court, by entering what is in essence a private agreement between parties to a
lawsuit, invokes the Supremacy Clause powers of the Federal Government to pre-empt state
regulatory laws. The District Court may well be correct, but I am not prepared to create a
precedent in this Court by summarily affirming its decision. This is particularly true when
it is not at all clear whether the summary affirmance disposes of the merits of the States'
contentions.
Id. at 1002 (citations omitted).
193. A Lexis search conducted by the author on November 1, 1991 shows the number of post
divestiture (1982) matters handled and reported by Judge Greene to be at least 142.
194. In United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231, Judge Greene stated:
Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this
Modification of Final Judgment, or, after the reorganization specified in section 1, a BOC to
apply to this Court at any time for such further orders or directions as may be necessary or
appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Modification of Final Judgment, for
the modification of any of the provisions hereof, for the enforcement of compliance herewith,
and for the punishment of any violation hereof.
Id.
195. See, e.g., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Section 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act requires us to set aside agency action if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).").
196. The Ninth Circuit accepted the following logic:
The FCC explains its lifting of the structural separation requirements by arguing that certain
developments in telecommunications markets and technologies have materially changed
circumstances in the industry. Specifically, the FCC asserts that technological advances,
political and regulatory pressure by the states, divestiture, and a generally competitive
enhanced services market have reduced the risks of both cross-subsidization and discriminatory
access.
Id.
197. "Section 10(e) of the APA requires us to determine whether the Commission's decision was a
reasonable exercise of its discretion, based on consideration of relevant factors, and supported by the record."
Id.
198. "The courts do not always constitute the optimal forum for addressing, much less soundly
resolving, complex regulatory issues. In the case of the AT&T settlement, turning matters over to the court
has created as many problems as it was supposed to resolve." MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial




The Supreme Court, in Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, stated
that given the "realities of technology and economics[,J ... intrastate service
... is thus conceivably within the jurisdiction of both state and federal authori-
ties."' 1  A recurring question, especially with respect to new rules or new
technology, like cable television," is whether Congress delegated responsibil-
ity for regulation to the FCC or left it with the states.201 Congress's indecision
is a serious impediment to local broadband network construction. Specifically,
the current regulatory system does not empower the FCC to regulate critical
aspects of local fiber optic network policy.2 2
Our society relies on private entities to provide a telecommunications
infrastructure. Therefore, congressional indecision and position reversal stymie
corporate officers' decisions to commit substantial capital resources to construct
local broadband networks. Until there is a clear government policy and regula-
tory philosophy upon which corporate action can be based, development of
competitive information transmission and information service markets will be
slight.
Congress must act now to form a new regulatory philosophy and set goals
within a workable policy structure. The Supreme Court, in New York v. FCC,
stated that the authority to preempt state laws resides in Congress when it acts
199. 476 U.S. 359, 360(1986). The affection doctrine has been interpreted to extend to intrastate utility
services:
As one commentator has put it: "By 1942, when Parker v. Brown was decided, the
interpretation and scope of the commerce clause had changed substantially. With the
development of the "affection doctrine" purely intrastate events-like state-mandated anti-
competitive arrangements with respect to in-state agricultural production or in-state provision
of utility services-'could be regulated under the commerce clause if these events had the
requisite impact on interstate commerce."'
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 636-37 (1976) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (citing Slater, Antitrust
and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 85 (1974))
200. Long before the Cable Act of 1984 the question came up whether the FCC had statutory authority
over the newly emerging cable television industry. The court of appeals upheld the FCC's authority,
holding:
The jurisdictional questions raised here are not altogether new; the explosive growth of
[cable television] has understandably caused the Commission a great deal of concern, and it
has undertaken, little by little, to assert its control over the industry. In the past, where similar,
if not identical, objections to the Commission's authority over [cable television] systems have
been advanced, the courts have held for the Commission.
General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d at 853.
201. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 359. See also, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d at 1240
(invoking the language of 47 U.S.C.A. § 152(2)(b)(1) (1991) and holding that "the broad language of §
2(b)(l) makes clear that the sphere of state authority which the statute 'fences off from FCC reach or
regulation."') (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 370).
202. For example, Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355, held that the FCC could not issue rules
regarding depreciation of past capital expenditures of the local exchange telephone companies. The
construction and finance section below will detail many important considerations which the FCC may not
have authority to regulate. Flexibility in accounting methods such as depreciation may be critical factors
in developing the economic climate necessary to attract the capital required for construction of local fiber
networks.
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within its constitutional powers and speaks with a clear and unambiguous
voice. 3  Therefore, Congress could establish a unified philosophy
encouraging the development of competitive local broadband networks with
competitive information marketplaces. This policy could eliminate the
indecision between state and federal regulatory authority and could empower
the FCC to orchestrate a coherent development policy.
D. Political Constituencies
The congressional role in regulation cannot be examined without
considering the political pressure exerted by both constituent consumers and
producers involved in the information industry.3° Principally these interests
are telephone companies, newspapers, television program producers, Hollywood
producers, cable television providers, and consumers. Political considerations
have already prompted special interest bills. One bill proposes to overturn Judge
Greene's decision to permit local telephone companies to originate information
services.0 5 Another proposal permits the BOCs to conduct research on,
design, and manufacture telecommunications equipment formerly prohibited by
the MFJ.2°6 Representative Brooks sponsored a bill to supersede the terms
of the MFJ.2 °7 The 1992 Cable Act is the most recent example of political
pressure influencing congressional regulatory action.
The original motivation for cable price re-regulation was the increase in
rates consumers were forced to pay. This consumer protection action soon
turned into a political struggle between economically opposed entities. The
battle lines were drawn over reconstructing the relationship between television
program production and program distribution and transmission. Rate regulation
became a subordinate substantive consideration, but a prominent political
rallying issue, once the powerful lobbyists were engaged. The most important
observation from this conflict is that the telecommunications industry is ex-
tremely powerful and its members often have diametrically opposed positions.
Implementation of the new philosophy proposed by this Article could
produce even greater conflicts. 0 . Historically, the change from a regulated
industry to a competitive one has met substantial resistance. Typically, the
regulated industry participants do not want to be subject to a competitive
203. New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988). See also, Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989).
204. "The post-divestiture experience reveals major political resistance to such deregulation." MacAvoy
& Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policymaking, supra note 21, at 257.
205. H.R. 3515, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
206. H.R. 1527, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
207. H.R. 5096, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
208. The framework proposed here would involve all the participants from the 1992 Cable Act battle,
plus the telephone companies and the print media concerns.
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market. 2 9 However, the outlook for local broadband networks need not be
so glum. Unlike established industries that are forced to change the way they
do business, local competitive broadband networks will open up new.possibili-
ties for both consumers and producers.
There are two steps which could accomplish this delicate political maneuver.
First, the executive and legislative branches firmly must resolve that it is in the
nation's interest to foster local competition in broadband transmission and
information service markets. To shore up this resolve, the public must be shown
how it will benefit. Second, the industry participants must be given potentially
lucrative incentives to agree to an amicable dissolution of the highly regulated
local telecommunications industry. The information transmission and service
providers must see how they will benefit from increased profit potentials in the
new regulatory environment of local broadband networks. Their profit potential
will be established through new product development and decreased production
costs. It must be emphasized to consumers that the new profit potential will
come from innovations in the telecommunications marketplaces rather than from
higher rates for existing services. Regulations to provide appropriate consumer
protection, based on true economic characteristics of individual marketplaces
must not be sacrificed to lure industry participants into accepting this new
philosophy. These political changes are possible, although their implementation
will require strong conviction and a vision of what the future could be with
competitive local broadband networks.
V. Rethinking Regulatory Structure
Fiber optic technology has evolved to cost parity with local copper facilities;
its deployment now depends on government action:21°
The evolving telecommunications infrastructure can accelerate economic
development and improve the quality of life for all Americans through
the delivery of health, education, entertainment, and other needed
services. Government can best help to make that happen, not by mandat-
ing its own blueprint for progress, but by serving as an intelligent
referee in a highly competitive contest among industry participants.
Competition in an open marketplace is the best guarantor of quality,
diversity, and affordability.2"'
209. AT&T is one example within the telecommunications industry.
210. "With fiber network costs only at parity with copper, any rapid fiber deployment must presume
that policy changes at the federal level are imminent, thus allowing the rate payer to reap the benefits of
fiber in terms of new services, besides immediate efficiencies from network modernization." Selander, supra
note 8, at 24.
211. NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
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Congress must demonstrate its ability to unify divergent interests and build a
consensus to encourage competition and construct local broadband net-
works." 2
The new regulatory philosophy should require separate treatment for
information services and information transmission. It is critical that this new
philosophy embrace the idea that local telecommunication marketplaces should
be competitive. If this philosophy is adopted, the congressional framework
should establish guidelines promoting critical policy objectives but also should
permit localities to develop individual regulations tailored to the unique needs
of each community.2 1 Alternately, if Congress adopts a policy encouraging
monopolistic transmission networks and information service providers, it will
effectively foreclose local competitive development. This Part suggests seven
policy objectives critical to the development of a new philosophy for local
broadband regulation.
A. Federal Role
A federal regulatory body will insure coherent development of local
broadband systems across the country. Among the most important roles a
regulatory body can perform is to adopt standards ensuring that independently
developed local transmission facilities will be compatible with each other. A
federal command and control structure, which might even implement direct
price regulation, would negate almost every benefit that competitive local
broadband networks could offer. The policy objectives proposed below would
establish a framework through which individual state and local regulatory
bodies could create less restrictive individualized regulations.
The FCC is a natural focal point for overseeing implementation and
operation of local fiber optic networks. No justification supports the creation
of a separate bureaucratic agency to supervise these new facilities. However,
in recognition of the fundamental alteration in regulatory philosophy, the
necessary deviation from past economic characterizations, and the recognition
of new powers required for effective implementation, Congress should pass a
212. MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policymaking, supra note 21, at 247.
213. The benefits of innovation under a decentralized system were nicely captured by one of the leading
figures in classical economics:
We flatter ourselves undeservedly if we represent human civilization as entirely the product
of conscious reason or as the product of human design, or when we assume that it is
necessarily in our power deliberately to recreate or to maintain what we have built without
knowing what we were doing.... Many of the greatest things man has achieved are the result
not of consciously directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately coordinated
effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the individual plays a part which he can
never fully understand. They are greater than any individual precisely because they result from
the combination of knowledge more extensive than a single mind can master.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CourER REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE 149-50 (Liberty Press 1979) (1952).
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separate enabling statute for a local broadband regulatory office. Additionally,
since this policy relies on competition, success will depend on federal
enforcement of antitrust laws.
B. National Information Offices
The congressional enabling statute ought to establish a new BroadBand
Office (BBO) within the FCC.2"4 The BBO should be divided into two subor-
dinate structures. The first, the National Information Transport Office (NITO),
would oversee the construction and the operation of local broadband transmis-
sion networks. Its counterpart, the National Information Services Office (NISO),
would oversee the establishment of competitive information services transmitted
through local broadband networks. Congress should clearly outline their powers
and duties, granting the NITO and NISO enough authority to ensure that a
coherent and unified national policy of development could be implemented.
National policy objectives must be set swiftly, before individual states and
localities take divergent paths, making a national policy impossible to
design.2"'
These offices would create an economic and regulatory environment in each
state and locality that would encourage competitive industry participants, rather
than directly regulate new industry participants. Secondly, these two national
offices would coordinate the implementation of critical policy objectives as
defined by Congress. Since state and local authorities would customize their
individual applications of these objectives, the national offices could ensure
basic compatibility among local variations.
C. State Information Offices
Each state should create two offices or agencies analogous to the federal
ones suggested above, referred to here as a State Information Transport Office
(S ITO) and a State Information Services Office (SISO). If appropriate, econom-
ically sound, and politically feasible, these offices could be regional,
encompassing more than one state. Alternatively, a state with diverse
development patterns could create multiple offices within its borders. These
offices should be streamlined and funded by small, fixed licensing fees imposed
214. Monetary restrictions are an appropriate political concern with the creation of a new federal office.
With the immense profit potential of new transmission and information services, a small licensing fee could
provide an adequate source of funding for this regulatory body and the associated local supervisory offices.
215. Many states are poised to begin regulatory programs that will supersede the construction of local
fiber optic networks. For one example, see the bills introduced in New Jersey's legislature. S. Res. 3617,
205th Sess., N.J., (introduced July 15, 1991) and Assembly Res. 5063, 205th Sess., N.J., (introduced June
27, 1991).
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on local broadband network and information service providers." 6 The SITO
and SISO would locally implement NITO and NISO guidelines, with
appropriate and flexible responses for each community's needs.
The formation of state and local offices will ensure a decentralized policy
implementation and allow for innovative approaches. Primarily, a SITO should
create an economic and structural environment that encourages competitive
broadband transmission network development. Secondly, it should oversee
operations to ensure policy objectives are carried out. A SISO should primarily
nurture a regional or local structural environment that would develop competi-
tive information service providers, and secondly, supervise the industry partici-
pants and ensure adherence to critical policy objectives. Both local offices
should formulate fall back provisions in case the economic characteristics of
a locality only support a monopolistic industry provider. This alternative policy,
however, must be structured to encourage competitive industry development
once such characteristics change.
D. Proposed Legislation
Congress already has begun considering the development of local broadband
networks by introducing the Communications Competitiveness and Infra-
structure Modernization Act of 1991 (CCIMA). 17 However, current drafts
of CCIMA do not satisfactorily address the concerns discussed in this Article.
Its enabling language merely creates an addendum to the regulatory power of
the FCC. 18 Particularly disturbing for setting a national policy framework
is CCIMA's restriction of federal power: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed to change the balance between the Federal and State regulatory
216. The fees should not be based on a percentage of gross revenue. A percentage fee would provide
states and localities with incentives to keep companies' gross revenues high. One method to keep a high
gross and therefore a high percentage would be to reduce price competition. The simplest way to reduce
price competition is to forbid or eliminate competitive industry participants.
217. S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2546, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
218. In pertinent part (from the Senate draft) the proposed bill states:
THE NEW NATIONAL GOAL
Sec. 102. Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151) is amended
by inserting immediately after "at reasonable charges," the following: "for the purpose of
establishing a nationwide, advanced, interactive, interoperable, broadband communications
system available to all people, businesses, services, organizations, and households on or before
the year 2015"....
Sec. 104. Title I of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), as amended
by section 103 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING
Sec. 10. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in order to improve and
foster the continued development of a nationwide communications infrastructure and to assure
the broad availability of information services, the Commission shall prescribe rules and
regulations establishing procedures for local exchange carriers. ...
S. 1200, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
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authorities with respect to multiple uses of communications technologies, as
in effect on the date of enactment of this section."2 9
The CCIMA explicitly denies the FCC the authority needed to develop,
guide, and implement a coherent policy for development of competitive local
broadband networks. For example, the FCC has limited authority to create
capital incentives for current telephone companies to invest in the construction
of local fiber optic networks.22 From the structure of the CCIMA, it is clear
that Congress implicitly or explicitly adopted the philosophy that only monopo-
lists will operate in each transmission marketplace. Perhaps in response to
Nippon Telephone & Telegraph's 22' stated goal to complete an all-fiber
network in Japan by the year 2015, U.S. legislators may have decided that
quick construction of local broadband networks by local telephone companies
would be more important than encouraging competition in the marketplace.
Furthermore, the CCIMA assumes the local broadband networks will merely
upgrade existing telephone or cable television networks.222 If the structure
set forth in the CCIMA is accepted, the true potential of local broadband
networks will be lost, and the prospect for competitive marketplaces will be
greatly diminished.
E. Critical Policy Objectives
The following objectives are essential to a unified and coherent policy
ensuring optimal development of local broadband networks. Since separate
corporate entities will construct our telecommunications infrastructure, we must
coordinate the development of new local broadband networks so that all
independently developed systems are compatible. Each political entity should
incorporate the objectives in a fashion tailored to the individual needs of its
constituent concern, while operating within the framework established by its
supervisory organization.
219. Id.
220. The FCC would be unable to adjust accounting methods so as to encourage sufficient capital
investment. Therefore, rapid construction would severely retard construction of local fiber optic networks
in some locations. The FCC has argued that
the revolution in telecommunications occasioned by the federal policy of increasing
competition in the industry will be thwarted by state regulators who have yet to recognize
or accept this national policy and who thus refuse to permit telephone companies to employ
accurate accounting methods designed to reflect, in part, the effects of competition.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 358-59.
221. NTT is the national telecommunications company of Japan and primarily owned by the Japanese
government.
222. The CCIMA in pertinent part states "the Commission shall prescribe rules and regulations
establishing procedures for local exchange carriers." S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). It makes no
mention of encouraging competition.
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1. Technical Standards
Before AT&T's divestiture, technical uniformity was easily achieved.
Telephony was transmitted by one system, under the control of one corporate
entity. Now, diverse participants provide a range of competitive
perspectives.2 23 Some experts believe that this process is inefficient and may
hinder the implementation of new technologies.2" Therefore, the national
offices should assume the position of intelligent referees and join international
standards committees to support standards which would benefit U.S. networks
and telecommunications industries.
The NITO should develop technical standards which ensure compatibility
of independently developed fiber optic networks with other telecommunication
systems. These standards should focus on the transport technology without
paying particular attention to any one information service. The NITO should
also publish and distribute these standards. This standard adoption process must
be put in place quickly .and efficiently.225
2. Open Network Architecture
Open Network Architecture (ONA) is essential to the promotion of competi-
tion in both the service and transmission industries.226 An ONA requirement
assures every interested party access to the local fiber optic network's technical
specifications. Prospective information suppliers could use this information to
design their services, and prospective network providers could use the
information to achieve inter-connectivity. National guidelines could reduce
needless transaction costs of interpreting widely variant network architecture
disclosure statements. Mandating the availability of network architecture and
223. Department of Commerce, Comprehensive Study of Domestic Telecommunications Infrastructure,
55 Fed. Reg. 800, 815 (1990).
224. "Recent studies indicate that voluntary standards may not always achieve efficient results." Id.
at 816 n.143. (citing Stanley M. Besen & Garth Selander, The Economics of Telecommunications Standards,
in CHANGING THE RULES 177, 193-201 (Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth Flamm eds., 1989)).
225. But keeping ahead of Japan and other economic rivals in telecommunications may be increasingly
difficult. Already, a dire lack of standards looms as a huge obstacle, complicating buying decisions and
slowing investment. "Every standards body seems to be churning out protocols left, right, and center," says
A.G. "Sandy" Fraser, executive director of information sciences research at AT&T Bell Laboratories. "We
may already have passed the point where we can all come together."
Coy, supra note 3, at 112.
226. The Department of Commerce has concluded:
The FCC's ONA program has the goals of promoting greater competition in enhanced services
markets and increased availability of these services to the general public, while preventing
discrimination by the BOCs in favor of their own enhanced services operations. ...
• . . Furthermore, to the extent ONA permits enhanced service providers to operate
efficiently and develop new services, the utility of the telecommunications network to their
customers should also be increased.
55 Fed. Reg. at 813. See Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 1, II
(1988), petitions for reconsideration pending.
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its technical specifications should stimulate competitive entrants in information
services and in information transmission by allowing easy access to information
that would be otherwise difficult to obtain.
3. Access
It is critically important that competitive information providers have access
to transmission facilities.22 7 It is equally imperative that competitive networks
interconnect. Access issues include the ability to physically connect to a
network as well as the ability to co-locate equipment. The local policy offices
must balance the need for access against competitors' potentially abusive
tactics. Special provisions should be established to deal with the exhaustion of
network facilities. This will be particularly important when network switches
cannot accommodate additional information services or connect additional
alternate networks. Which entity decides who gains access to the local
broadband networks and how may be one of the most important access issues.
Although the question of access does not arise until an operating network is
in place, it must be considered contemporaneously with the policy of
development. This is especially true if competitive local networks would make
a significant difference in policy. These policies should be formulated on a state
wide scale, but individual application could be flexible.
4. First Amendment Principles
First Amendment issues are tied inexorably to the question of access.22
This topic is exceedingly complex and worthy of a separate analysis.2
227. The cable television industry exhibits great similarities to a fiber system regarding questions of
access. Therefore, it is instructive to look at access regulation in the cable industry.
The FCC, in 1972, promulgated access requirements for cable, Cable Television Report and
Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 189-98 (1972), revised in Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976),
which were struck down in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest
Video I), on jurisdictional grounds. Congress adopted limited access regulations in the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, §§ 611,612, 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532 (1991). State and
local access regulations, which are often more comprehensive than those at the federal level,
remain in effect. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066.2 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 238.081, subd. 4(3)(iv) (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
subtit. R, § 595.4(b) (1986).
Access to Cable Network Monopoly, and the First Amendment, supra note 175, at 1663 n.3.
228. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In pertinent part it states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
229. See Access to Cable Network Monopoly, and the First Amendment, supra n6te 175, at 1663. The
application of the first amendment to cable television has been guided by the Supreme Court's statement
that "[e]ach medium of expression. . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited
to it .... Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). The idea that different media
should be accorded different First Amendment treatment has been repeatedly accepted by the Supreme Court.
See also, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 97 (1949)) ("Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the
'differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers' of each method"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
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Nonetheless, access concerns support the encouragement of competition in the
development of local broadband networks.
Professor Nadel explains the central access question as: "What First
Amendment protection do media owners have against laws and regulations that
would require them to disseminate the messages of others? In other words, what
types of media access rules will survive First Amendment challenges?"23
Professor Nadel provides a framework for analyzing access issues:
The proposed test for ascertaining the constitutionality of regulations
granting access to media sorts them into three categories. If access to
a medium is available at competitive prices and in reasonable units of
quantity, the First Amendment does not permit media owners to be
saddled with access regulations. Common carrier-like regulations are
desirable (and are required for a publicly owned medium) where a
medium has characteristics of a natural monopoly. The only media that
may be subject to the most intrusive content-based regulations, including
a public trustee standard or some manifestation of the Fairness Doctrine,
are those for which neither alternative is viable. The courts should treat
the third category as one of last resort.23'
Professor Laurence Tribe wrote, "[t]he rate of- technological change has
outstripped the ability of the law, lurching from one precedent to another, to
address new realities. ' 232 In developing a framework to determine the future
of the telecommunications infrastructure of this country, Congress must consider
First Amendment issues.
5. Integrated Customer Base
As competition arises in local telecommunication networks, the economic
characteristics of some localities may drive some local fiber optic network
developers to serve only the most, profitable customers. 233 Non-integrated
local networks may destroy efficiencies found in universal broadband connec-
tion and produce an undesirable division between the economically advantaged
and disadvantaged. If there is no requirement to integrate customer bases,
U.S. 367, 386 (1969) ("[Dlifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them.")
230. See Mark S. Nadel, A Technology Transparent Theory of the First Amendment and Access to
Communications Media, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 158 (1991).
231. Id. at 183-84.
232. Katsh, supra note 2, at 1493 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 930,
1007 (2d ed. 1988)).
233. For example in his article supra note 166, at 414 n.6, Commissioner Barrett cited numerous cases
where local exchange telephone service companies were being pressured by competition.
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exclusive fiber networks will develop, leaving potential, but less lucrative
customers unconnected."M Therefore, the policies guiding the development
of local broadband networks should ensure all local broadband network devel-
opers serve an integrated customer base. The integrated customer base should
be mapped by policy makers who are most familiar with the geographical area
and economic distribution of potential customers. The key to achieving this
object will be a balance between a sincere attempt to price close to marginal
cost and the need for some subsidization. Government policy cannot forbid the
development of private broadband networks, which means those customers with
the financial means may flee a public switched broadband network if resultant
prices are significantly above marginal costs. One method of encouraging
integrated customer bases might be marginal cost pricing.235 Nevertheless,
integrated customer bases may also allow a certain amount of cross-
subsidization between high-volume, high-profit users and low-volume, low-
profit customers. Although cross-subsidization is economically inefficient, for
a limited time it may be a socially desirable way to connect an integrated
customer base to a local broadband network. After essential service costs fall
because of economies of scale and other factors, it may be possible to move
toward marginal pricing for all customers. Some form of subsidization may be
a necessary political concession, at least in the beginning, to obtain the political
consensus needed for implementation of this new philosophy that encourages
a competitive framework at every level of the local telecommunications market-
place.
234. A Department of Commerce study voices this concern:
NTIA [the National Telecommunications and Information Administration] is of the view that
public networks play a special role in our nation's telecommunications infrastructure. First,
as a matter of efficiency, public networks with their ubiquity, interoperability, and network
design (based on switches and shared facilities) have certain technical and economic
advantages over non-public networks for many applications. Second, as a matter of equity,
public networks are available not only to large users, but to small businesses and organizations
and residential users. Thus, we are concerned that regulatory and other public policies not
result in a public network infrastructure that is so technically unsophisticated and
uneconomically priced that it ill serves both large users (who will abandon it for private
solutions) and small users (who will have to do without advanced services). Such a result
would be neither efficient nor equitable.
55 Fed. Reg. 800, 801 (1990).
235. Marginal pricing of broadband transmission services would deter bypass networks. Lessons from
telephony regulation can be instructive in this area of policy formation, as discussed by Dean MacAvoy:
Inefficient duplication of local exchange functions can be avoided if local telephone companies
are permitted to price their distribution services in line with marginal costs. Marginal cost
pricing would eliminate the incentive for firms to enter select local exchange markets to skim
away profits which the BOCs currently generate to subsidize local telephone rates.
MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policymaking, supra note 21, at 256.
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6. Universal Service
The idea of an integrated customer base dovetails with the objective of
universal and affordable broadband service.
For more than 50 years, a cornerstone of United States telecommunica-
tions policy has been "to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-
wide ... communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges." ... NTIA stated that: "In light of the possibilities of new
service offerings by the 21st Century, as well as the growing importance
of telecommunications and information services to U.S. economic and
social development, limiting our concept of universal service to the
narrow provision of basic voice telephone service no longer serves the
public interest.".. . Others suggest that a failure to expand the concept
of universal service could result in society becoming divided between
the "information rich" - with access to a wide range of innovative
services, and the "information poor" - served only by basic voice
service. The economic and social implications of such a scenario run
counter to long-held American policy goals of promoting equal
opportunity.... In addressing whether "universal service" should be
redefined, we must consider two questions: (a) Service definition:
Whether the service components to be offered universally should be
different from the "basic voice services" now commonly offered and
whether these components should be included in the monthly "basic
service package" or offered as optional features, and (b) universality:
How the service should be made universally available and afford-
able.236
However, some experts contend that imposing regulations to foster universal
availability of advance broadband networks at affordable prices is incompatible
with a desire to develop information services in a competitive marketplace.237
Other experts argue that some regulation mixed with competitive marketplaces
pressures will better serve the nation economically.238 Although which new
236. 55 Fed. Reg. 800, 816 (1990).
237. Lavey, supra note 187, at 153 (citing Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, A Proposal for
Universal Telecommunications Service, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 351, 370 (1988)). See also 55 Fed. Reg. 800,
803 (1990).
238. See Lavey, supra note 187, at 101, for an excellent discussion of this topic. Lavey contends that
such a combination of proper regulation and competitive market development will benefit the "nation in
terms of economic activity, education, health care and the quality of life in general." Id. at 189. See also
55 Fed. Reg. 800, 802 (citing E. PARKER, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF THE REA TELEPHONE LOAN
PROGRAM (1983)) ("Parker estimated that the Rural Electrification Administration's ("REA") telephone loan
program contributed $283 million to U.S. GDP in 1980, as well as $196 million in new tax revenues from
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information services will be included under the umbrella term of universal
service with the advent of local fiber optic networks may be debatable, univer-
sal telephony services should remain a firm goal of any national or local policy.
7. Local Network Ownership
Consideration should be given to the ownership of the companies that will
own and operate local fiber optic networks as well as those that will own and
operate individual information services. One option is to restrict ownership to
United States entities.2 39 Clearly, as has been brought out in this Article, local
broadband networks will become the lifelines in our country's economy.m
Additionally, foreign control of local fiber optic networks might affect our
national defense." Therefore, majority ownership of local broadband
networks must remain in American hands. This does not preclude foreign
ownership of debt instruments, an important source of potential financing, as
long as they were not convertible to equity interest.
F. Summary
The creation of the proposed national, state, and local policy offices will
provide sufficient flexibility for regional concerns and allow innovative
approaches to difficult problems. The currently proposed CCIMA does none
of the above. It does, however, perpetuate the misconception that local
telecommunication networks are natural monopolies and severely limits the
potential for competitive development. In encouraging a re-evaluation of
Congressional action, this analysis outlines seven critical policy objectives that
are consistent with national goals and the encouragement of competitive
industry participants. However, no one of these considerations should dictate
policy formation. Rather, they should be the cornerstones of policies that allow
flexible consideration of individual circumstances.
REA borrowers and subscribers whose income had increased as a result of having telephone service.").
239. See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 310 (1991), which forbids ownership of broadcast licenses by aliens,
representatives of aliens, corporations organized under the laws of a foreign government or corporations
having ownership or alien directors positions as specified in 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 310(b)(3), 310(b)(4) (1991).
240. "Over 50 percent of all U.S. workers are currently employed in information-intensive service
industries that are heavily reliant on telecommunications ...." 55 Fed. Reg. 800 (1990) (citing BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. (1988)). Furthermore,
"in a recent survey of U.S. business executives, the vast majority of the respondents stated that the domestic
telecommunications infrastructure is 'absolutely critical' to the nation's economic prosperity." Id.
241. "[Tlhe strategic nature of telecommunications for national defense and the common wellsprings
of and similarities between military and civilian telecommunications equipment, suggest that many ties still
exist between civilian and military development in this field. ... Derian, supra note 191, at 75.
Furthermore the U.S. military uses the public switched network through the Defense System Network (DSN).
If the local exchange carriers utilized the local fiber optic networks, the DSN would be transmitted over
the fiber network resulting in U.S. military information under the control of foreign entities.
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VI. Construction Issues
Current industry initiatives disprove the conclusion that a natural monopoly
is inevitable in every local information transmission marketplace 42 Nonethe-
less, the demise of the system that perpetuates currently regulated transmission
monopolies as the sole providers in most local telecommunications marketplaces
will not occur without regulatory reform.3 While the installation of fiber to
each customer premises already is anticipated, z' the policy guiding develop-
ment of local broadband networks must encourage competitive entry. 245
Furthermore, the operational regulations must be structured, so projected
revenues will attract competitive entrants into the information transmission
industry. The regulatory scheme adopted must take into account the following
issues: location of the fiber optic lines, financing of the local network
development, choice of network developers, and potential profitability of the
enterprise.
A. Placement of the Local Optic Network
A local broadband network's optical fiber must connect to each customer's
premises in order to permit access to the transmission network. Technical
considerations will dictate whether the fiber will be strung on utility poles or
buried in conduits. Currently, local telephone exchange companies have virtual-
ly universal connectivity to potential customers.46 Cable television transmis-
sion facilities pass nearly as many customer premises. The preferred broadband
network configuration will probably match one of these existing transmission
facility routes.47 Therefore, the best option will be to co-locate the fiber with
the local phone company's copper wire routes or cable television's coaxial
242. "In reality, a more likely scenario is that there will be competition, or the threat of competitive
entry, at all levels of the market. There already exists the potential for a competing broadband network in
most markets ...." Harrison, supra note 164, at 52.
243. "The basic structure of regulation must change if the [BOC] industry is to remain competitive
in tomorrow's telecommunications market." Harrison, supra note 164, at 54.
244. For example:
By the end of the decade, as many as one in five residential telephone lines is expected to
be "fibered" in areas of the country such as the [Sloutheast, where growth is high and a need
exists for advanced telecommunications services. In such areas, complete conversion is
expected by about 2010-2011.
Shumate & Snelling, supra note 6, at 68.
245. Bruce L. Egan, Telecommunications Strategy in an Age of Risk, PUB. UT1L. FORT., April 26, 1990,
at 22, 23.
246. "The FCC's studies indicate that, as ofJuly 1989, over 93 percent of American households had
telephones." Lavey, supra note 187, at 154 (citing FCC News No. 723: Preliminary Domestic Information
from Statistics of Communications Common Carriers Released by FCC, at Table 9 (1989)).
247. "The general consensus .'mong the [regional Bell holding companies] appears to be that a star
architecture is preferable." Marshall Yates, The Promise of Fiber Optics, PUB. UTrL. FORT., Aug. 16, 1990,
at 14, 15.
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routes. Co-location would reduce the unknown and potentially large transaction
costs associated with negotiating new rights of way.m Congress must adopt
enabling legislation that defines optical fiber transmission facilities as a compat-
ible use with most existing utility rights of way 9 and reasonably assures the
ability to co-locate.
250
However, some portions of the new local broadband network architecture
may differ from embedded facility routes. If part of the new fiber network
cannot co-locate, state legislatures can provide an alternative solution. State
enabling legislation should grant the same powers of condemnation to the fiber
developer as are granted to most local telephone companies through franchise
agreements .5'
Currently, the question of telecommunications access in multiple dwellings
and new developments is unsettled.5 2 As a result, divergent regional policies
are developing. Federal policy guidelines must provide states and localities with
model statutory language and discourage aberrant regional impediments to
universal connectivity.
B. Financing Options
Government policy can help solve the complex problem of financing the
construction of competitive fiber networks. 253 Developing financial incentives
248. Cable companies are permitted to construct cable systems over rights-of-way and through
easements that have been dedicated for compatible uses. 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(2) (1991). The court in Centel
Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905 (11 th Cir. 1990), held that this was not
a violation of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
249. See 47 U.S.C.A. §541(2) (1991). This section of the 1984 Cable Act addresses this problem but
does not clearly state that cable is a compatible use. It authorizes construction over public rights of way
which have been dedicated to other uses to which cable may or may not be comparable. The congressional
declaration of fiber as compatible should be broad enough to allow its placement in co-location with an
existing technically acceptable transmission facility including electrical power lines, natural gas pipelines,
or railroad rights of way. The purpose for this broad declaration would be to reduce legal challenges to
"compatible users" and to reduce transaction costs. See also, Williams Telecommunications Co. v. Gragg,
750 P.2d 398 (Kan. 1988) (fiber and natural gas pipelines found to be non-compatible uses, but taking
allowed). But see, Re Hawaiian Electric Co., 87 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 227 (Hawaii P.U.C. 1987) (did
not allow co-location of fiber and electrical transmission facilities because public right of way for electrical
transmission was incompatible with information transmission through fiber optics).
250. Compensation might be required to allow some co-location in view of the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against takings.
251. Under the current enabling statutes of individual states, the Franchise Agreements with the local
telephone companies authorize their actions as public utilities with the right of condemnation equivalent
to local municipalities. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:17-9.1 (West 1991 Supp).
252. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (installation of cable
facilities constituted a taking); Cable Assoc. v. Town & Cty. Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (no right to interior access); Cable TV Fund 14-A v. Property Owners Ass'n, 706 F. Supp. 422
(D. Md. 1989) (cable provider was able to enforce its right of access to public utility easements); Cable
Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1989) (denied cable operator right of access to multi-
unit dwellings); Nagelhout, supra note 160, at 46.
253. One observer believes that
a 'strategic investment' probably will be required to advance fiber 'over the hump' to the
crossover point. The strategic investment is the total excess cost of fiber over copper expended
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and a policy framework that creates incentives for entry into the competitive
telecommunications marketplace is critical to fostering interest and competition
in the local transmission industry.54 A prospective transmission provider's
decision to enter the industry will be linked to its expected return on
investment. 5 The following five options are broad categories of financing
resources, but are by no means an exhaustive set of alternatives.
1. Corporate Structure
The traditional corporate structure offers the ability to draw upon a diverse
and broad base of financial resources such as equity and debt securities and
loans from lending institutions. Since regulated industries often yield lower rates
of return than firms in unregulated industries, government policy may need to
provide incentives for private investing in particular local network developers
that remain regulated. 6 However, incentives for private investing in competi-
tive, unregulated local transmission developers may be unnecessary. New local
broadband transmission network developers may readily find private investors
for their new ventures.257 The government could influence investor behavior
in the first few years. This expenditure reduces the investment per subscriber to acceptable
levels by moving the costs down the experience curve .... More importantly, the timing of
this investment is also in question ... deployment really does not begin until public policy
changes.
Selander, supra note 8, at 30.
254. If policy is formed without contemplating alternative resources or participants, the framework
designed to encourage quick local broadband network development may undermine the ability of competitors
to enter the market place. Transaction costs and barriers to entry may be embodied in a policy which favors
current information transmission providers. These providers would then have incentives to perpetuate ideas
of natural monopoly status which would insure their market position.
255. Operation revenue can be derived from two sources: transmission fees and information service
fees.
256. If the corporate structure seeking capital is a public utility subjected to regulation by a government
commission, its ability to deliver a highly attractive return on investor's equity may be severely limited.
The Supreme Court in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1941), recognized the
problems involved with raising capital in a regulated environment. However, the court held that the
regulations need only be just and reasonable. Id. at 602. In its opinion the court stated:
The rate making process . . . i.e., the fixing of "just and reasonable" rates, involves a
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. case that "regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net
revenues." But such consideration aside, the investor interest has a legitimate concern with
the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or
company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating
expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and
dividends on the stock. . . . By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.
That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of
the enterprise so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.
Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
257. "According to Professor William Davidson of the University of Southern California, more money
was invested in private information networks last year 11989] than in the publicly available system." Barrett,
supra note 166, at 424 (citing Davidson, Telecommunications Takes Off: While the U.S. Dithers, Other
Nations are Aggressively Modernizing to Compete, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1989, §4, at 3).
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through a temporary reduction in tax rates for investments in broadband trans-
mission companies.2 58 If this -incentive were available, corporations might
engage in quick construction of local fiber networks to realize substantial profits
and a high rate of return for their shareholders.
2. Corporate Tax Issues
Adjusted tax burdens can create significant capital resources within corpora-
tions, especially current telecommunications companies.259 Corporations with
significant capital expenditures might be induced to develop networks if their
federal and state taxes were reduced. 26 ° The government could create the capi-
tal for construction by accelerating the depreciation of a corporation's capital
plant expenditures in return for local fiber network development.26' The
change in depreciation rates could be tied directly to demonstrable expenditures
on construction of local fiber networks. While reduced tax revenues present a
valid concern, revenue losses may be offset shortly thereafter by increased tax
revenue from technology suppliers. An overall increase in GDP26 2 also would
result from expanding marketplaces for information services and information
transmission.263 Investment tax credits for fiber optic networks could also
stimulate local broadband network development. However, the corporate tax
incentives must not be aimed solely at the current local telecommunications
providers.
258. The Congressional policy encouraging information transmission facility development would receive
considerable financial backing if it was coordinated with small changes in tax policy that would encourage
equity investment in local fiber optic network installer-operators. The most appropriate policy would reduce
the tax rate for returns on this type of equity investment. This union of policies could accomplish two very
desirable effects. First, it would encourage equity investment as opposed to debt instrument funding. Second,
it would accelerate the development of the local fiber network resulting in an accelerated development in
the new information services marketplace, bringing new jobs, new industry, and a greater tax base.
259. "Due to the tremendous cash flow and healthy financial position of the phone companies ...
investment funds are generated internally, without borrowing. Capital turnover rates are high at over eight
percent per year, and in 1988 depreciation alone provided almost ninety percent of funds required for new
construction." Egan, supra note 245, at 22.
260. For example, local telephone companies have significant capital expenditures, especially in their
embedded copper transmission facilities and switching machines. "Phone companies collectively spend about
$25 billion annually on new capital.... their total network capitalization is about $180 billion." Egan, supra
note 245, at 22. However, other industries also have significant capital expenditures. These industries might
be interested in developing fiber optic networks if tax incentives encouraged such investment.
261. This could apply to many industries that have capital expenditures depreciated over periods of
time.
262. "[Tloday, over half of our gross national product and employment are tied to the distribution of
information." Burns, supra note 7, at 17.
263. Analogy to the expenditures of Rural Electrification Administration and resultant tax revenues
is appropriate. See Parker, supra note 238.
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3. Government Loans
Low cost government loans or direct grants to construct local fiber networks
may be necessary when profit motives fail to promote financing or to facilitate
competition among transmission providers. However, some experts believe that
direct public financing would be detrimental to the overall efficiency of the
marketplace."M While there may be little chance of direct governmental grants
in an era of increasing government debt, limited government loans similar to
those administered through the Rural Electrification Administration's loan
programs may be feasible.
2 65
In fact, governmental financing may be necessary to achieve universal
telephony service. Financial assistance will be needed especially in
economically depressed and rural areas. Limited government financial
participation is appropriate for ensuring that rural and disadvantaged areas may
benefit from the expanded resources of a broadband network.2 66 Local policy
makers must balance the interests between government financial participation,
integrated customer bases, and local broadband service areas that might not
allow marginal cost pricing.
4. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures between independent corporations broaden the financial base
of prospective developers and reduce the risk to individual investors. One of
the most appealing suggestions has come from the electric utility industry.
2 67
The electric industry proposed to subsidize part of the construction costs of
broadband facilities in order to realize the potential that local broadband
networks would facilitate highly efficient demand-side management of energy
production.
2 68
264. See Barrett, supra note 166, at 423. Commissioner Barrett suggests that publicly financed fiber
networks would not be advisable "because the encouragement of private enterprise will bring about
efficiency, product and service innovation, and lower rates." Barrett, supra note 166, at 424.
265. Barrett, supra note 166, at 424.
266. Id.
267. See Rivkin, White Knights for Fiber Nets: How Electrics Can Help Telcos Build Fiber to the
Home, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 16, 1990, at 20.
268. The following description of "demand-side management" is a technical simplification. If electric
producers could receive demand information from electric consumers in real-time, they could adjust their
output. The investment electric companies would make in the construction of local fiber networks would
be more than recouped by the savings they would derive from more efficient production. This increased
efficiency is justified solely on an economic basis; however, society also benefits from conservation of
natural resources used to produce electricity and the resultant decrease in pollutant by-products of the
production process. Id. "[P]reliminary results are tantalizing; TransTexT, for one, has documented a 23
percent drop in electricity peak consumption with the utility making more money and the consumer spending
less." Id. at 23.
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5. Rate-Base Investment
The rate-base investment method of financing directly incorporates the cost
of construction into transmission rates. This financing will only be available
to public utilities such as local telephone or cable television companies and is
an arrangement devoid of competitive pressures, a lack of which could foster
significant inefficiencies. However, since not every locality is likely to develop
a competitive transmission industry, this form of financing, in the absence of
others, would allow a fiber network to be constructed.
Rate-base investment requires substantial price regulation, and customers
will receive no competitive industry benefit. If this financing is used, state
regulators must be particularly careful to maintain the separation between
transmission and information service providers. Public utility boards generally
require investments derived from the rate-base to be "used and useful" to the
rate payer.269 Because of this requirement, rate-base funding has met signifi-
cant resistance from state officials charged with protecting captive rate pay-
ers." Thus, it is the least desirable option outlined in this Article. Even so,
it may be necessary in some areas until a substantial number of information
services are available and are sufficiently profitable to support a competitive
transmission system.
6. Summary
Each of the first four financing options can encourage development of a
competitive transmission industry or at least help to create a contestable one.
However, the reaction of capital investors and private industry cannot be
predicted. Government policy will be the determinative factor for both parties.
Therefore, the BBO and NITO should create policies that encourage privately
financed construction.
The initial transmission provider, in non-competitive marketplaces, probably
will be the currently operating local telephone company. In these cases, the
primary financing concern will be the burden borne by the captive rate payers.
This becomes especially acute in the short run because the rate payer will not
see a benefit during construction of local broadband networks. One way to
solve this problem is to allow the local telephone companies to accelerate
depreciation and thereby offer higher investment returns to attract private
capital.
269. Rivkin, supra note 267, at 20.
270. The typical state agency is called the Public Advocates office. Its primary concern is to protect
average rate payers from shouldering the financial burden of constructing a fiber network when they, in
the perception of the advocate agency, might not see immediate benefit from increased rates.
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C. Construction
Currently, more than thirty local fiber network tests are underway.
271
These efforts will contribute valuable information to prospective network
developers. Two construction scenarios are possible: a single developer or
multiple network developers .1 2 The outcome in each geographic area should
be determined by market forces, as Andrew Barrett, the Commissioner of the
FCC, has opined. 73 A streamlined licensing procedure guaranteeing the
applicant's compliance with NITO and SITO requirements should precede
construction. 274 Compliance with local integrated customer base requirements
must be strictly enforced.275 The definition of a "local network" should be
left ambiguous so that it can reflect both prevailing economic forces and the
SITO's requirement of integrated customer base.
It is logical to consider the possibility that current telecommunications
providers will construct fully integrated fiber networks. 276 Although these
companies appear to be the obvious broadband network developers, policy must
271. "Over 30 tests now are being conducted by various telephone companies." Yates, supra note 247,
at 14. See In re Application of General Telephone Co. of California, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1148 (July
17, 1989) (waiver of telephone/cable cross-ownership rules granted to allow an experimental local fiber
network (ultimately to 5000 homes) to be constructed in Cerritos, California).
272. An interesting question arises with this assumption: should the construction and operation of the
new network be considered separately? The operation could be based on grants of franchise operation for
limited periods of time. This arrangement would provide incentives to reduce rates in non-competitive
marketplaces. The renewal process could take into account past performance including evaluation of quality
of service, encouragement of new service offering and rates. However, this option raises serious questions
regarding transmission facility ownership and significant government oversight.
273. "As to the question of whether sufficient revenues will be generated to justify two loops to the
home, I feel that is a question the market should decide." Andrew C. Barrett, The Potential of Fiber Optics
to the Home: A Regulator's Perspective, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 19, 1989, at 14.
274. The requirements should reflect basic objectives and include any particular local criteria especially
important for the particular geographical deployment. NITO's policy should set the bounds of local
requirements so they cannot become burdensome. More importantly, NITO should prohibit local policies
which would protect primary transmission providers from subsequent competition. The national policy should
forbid local constraints from being considered except where a compelling government interest was present.
The national policy should specifically exclude claims of inability to operate in a competitive environment
as compelling government interests justifying local franchise restrictions.
275. "Today, many [local phone companies] are watching a new breed of competition lay fiber in many
of their prime service areas. These alternative access providers are cream-skimming the high-end of the
market by providing state-of-the-art (fiber) facilities at prices below [current] tariffs." Harrison, supra note
164, at 53; see also Bruce W. Radford, Fiber Optic Networks Nibble Away at the Bell Local Monopoly,
PuB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 21, 1989, at 4; California v. FCC, 905 F.2d at 1234-35.
276. Such a policy is not without competitive pressures, as some may argue:
Some industry observers might be tempted to throw stones at phone company strategy for fiber
optics as anti-competitive or just plain folly, and recommend public policies preventing it,
but this would be wrong. Remember the alternative business strategy remaining open to phone
companies - invest their money elsewhere in anything from pizza parlors to mortgage
banking. Since phone companies are businesses, they should be allowed to invest in adoption
and deployment of new technology for the future benefit of phone users and for revenue
growth.
Egan, supra note 245, at 23. See also 137 CONG. REC. S7054 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (introduction of the
Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991 by Sen. Conrad Bums).
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not be structured around their peculiar interests, as it is in some recently
proposed legislation. 7 It is critical that the NITO and SITOs not develop
their construction policy so as to favor one potential local fiber network
developer over another.
Conclusion
Legislatures should consider the following guidelines when devising
regulatory structures governing local fiber optic networks. Competition should
be encouraged in both the information transmission marketplace and the
information services marketplace. Uniform technical standards must be adopted
to ensure compatibility of local networks. Access to the network's technical
specifications and transmission facilities must be provided to all potential
competitors. Local networks must provide affordable broadband service to all
residential and commercial customers. Regulators should promote domestic
ownership of local fiber optic networks.
Federal and state regulatory agencies must be established to implement these
policy objectives. Sufficient flexibility, however, should be accorded each
locality to respond to indigenous variations. With the appropriate regulatory
policy, the potential for United States dominance in the global information age
will be limited only by the ingenuity and vision of its citizens.
277. For example, a bill introduced in the New Jersey legislature, but not passed in this form, provided
financial incentives for pre-existing local telephone companies only. In pertinent part, the bill reads as
follows:
4. In order to. provide appropriate incentives to encourage economic development and
investment in the telecommunications infrastructure, the board shall have the authority to
approve an economic development program proposed by a local exchange telephone company
which is designed to develop a state-of-the-art telecommunications infrastructure. Any
economic development program must, at minimum, include:
a. A comprehensive, long-term program of infrastructure development for the local
exchange telephone company extending over a fixed term of years.
S. Res. 3617, 205th Sess., N.J., (introduced July 15, 1991).
The Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991 also exclusively
targets the local telephone companies. "[Elach local exchange carrier shall prepare and carry out a broadband
communications system implementation plan for the states in which such carrier operates." S. 1200, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1991).

